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Foreword 
 
I conducted this research study in the framework of Policy Research Fellowships 
Program of Open Society Forum in order to study how the ODA Mongolia received 
from donor countries and international organizations in recent years contributed general 
economic development, particularly rural development of our country and drawing 
policy recommendations on further aid policies.  
 
I performed the research by meeting relevant people of the government ministries and 
agencies, donor organizations and projects implementation units in Mongolia and in the 
form of local field visits in rural areas, during spring and summer months of 2004. 
 
Here I should mention that the research was conducted by a single researcher, therefore 
it was impossible to cover all levels of rural society down to the level of a herdsmen 
family, so I limited the coverage to aimag centers, which had the highest level or 45 
percent of poverty by recent statistics (of 1998) and were focal points to deliver rural 
development.      
 
On the basis of the research result, I suggested priority fields in rural areas, particularly 
in aimag centers, where should ODA be concentrated at first order.  Also possible 
measures to be taken in the framework of ODA policy, implementation, monitoring and 
coordination were recommended not only for ODA in rural areas but also for ODA in 
general. 
 
This policy research was conducted during election 2004, which was a fairly difficult time 
for catching and reflecting reality. With a newly established government having the 
opportunity to set ODA policies, we hope that our proposed recommendations will 
make a positive contribution to the new government's policy making.     
 
Here we would like to express our sincere gratitude to the staff members of the Open 
Society Forum, who felt the sense of above necessities, initiated, sponsored and provided 
all kinds of supports to this research; regional coordinators of the Soros Foundation, 
who actively participated and assisted in the research; Mr. David Dyer who gave 
invaluable advice and instructed the process from the beginning; and advisor Mr. 
Sh.Gungaadorj, who edited the research report. 
 
Finally, I am grateful to government officers, business people and local people in aimags 
for their attachment of significance to the research, sincere attitude and kind provision of 
all possible information. 
 
S. Bat-Oyun 
Economist 
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ONE. BRIEF SUMMARY 
 
The ODA of 2.5 billion USD, Mongolia received since 1991, has greatly contributed the 
country in overcoming early periods of transition to a market economy with less trouble 
and laying the foundation of market economy. However, highly efficient use of the 
above amount of ODA would have resulted in GDP per capita 3-10 times higher than 
current level, poverty reduction to 10 % and infant mortality reduction to 7 per 1000 live 
birth, which is 3-4 times lower than their current level. Also it was estimated that the 
domestic investment would have reached the level- 9 times higher than the current level. 
It is related to the fact that Mongolia has poor economic policy and institutional 
structure and mechanism as well as poor implementation of laws and rules.      
 
Research shows that the ODA effectiveness is disappointing, especially in rural areas. It 
was explained by reasons of basically no development policy management, planning and 
priority setting, inadequate policy making and coordination; low salary level of civil 
servants, consequently leading to ethical distortion and corruption; and lack of a 
permanent system of monitoring and information. Also many factors, like over-
politicization of ministries, implementing agencies and local government bodies; 
instability of human resource policies; and social-oriented, but not growth-oriented 
working approaches had negative effects on the ODA effectiveness. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to say that the ODA effectiveness shall be increased by adopting sound 
economic policies, long and medium-term strategic planning, setting a list of ODA 
priorities, preferring economic efficiency as a basic indicator of project evaluation, 
organizing broad discussions on utilizing projects with economic efficiency rather than 
social ones, and creating public information system that provides systematic information 
on incoming foreign aid. And research results show that ODA can be economically more 
efficient if we use it further concentrating on a few directions such as private sector 
development, energy sector, small and medium enterprises  that process  livestock-origin 
and natural raw materials and housing projects at aimag centers.      
 
Moreover, there is a necessity to create a monitoring system that controls each stage of 
ODA policies and directions, project selection, qualification, implementation and follow-
up stages. It is not an idea to create a completely new organization. Rather, we need to 
create a system where citizens, civil society and research institutions play a major role, 
while adding another condition to disclose information  in designing its working 
mechanism. Also, it is important to maintain a direction to increase the portion of grant 
aid in ODA up to 65-70% while reducing portion of loans down to 35-30%, as a common 
standard  of other developing countries. 
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TWO.  BACKGROUND 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
Our country has received 2.5 billion USD of ODA between 1991-2002.  
 
The ODA Mongolia received between 1991-2002 has greatly contributed to the country's 
effort to overcome the socioeconomic transition and crisis situation of early 1990s. 
Mongolia made its transition with less troubles than it might have had, and laid a sound 
foundation for a market economy. For instance, a shortage of consumer products, 
including food and power supply, and severe balance of payment problems caused by the 
breakdown of former system were covered by the ODA, which created an opportunity to 
pass through this period of widespread socioeconomic problems in a relatively short 
period of time.  In addition, ODA greatly contributed in laying basic foundations and 
implementing transition to a market economy properly.   
 
In early years ODA took a form of emergency aid, and then later (from 1994 when the 
crisis situation gave signs of ending and the economy started to grow)  it was used for 
physical infrastructure (energy, road and transportation and financial sectors) with to 
the intent of  stabilizing the economy and laying foundations of market economy. 
Thanks to continuous efforts of Mongolian Government and with the needed infusion of 
ODA, the economy gradually grew, inflation was reduced from a triple digit rate to a 
single digit rate and private sector-based economic foundation was laid  down. For the 
last three years of transition, the government prioritised development of market system, 
poverty reduction, capacity building  and strenthening of the public services. 
 
Although the government disbursed ODA equals to 2.5 times the country's GDP in the 
last decade, today the country still experiences a slow economic growth, high poverty 
level,  and continious migration from rural to urban areas.   This lack of progress raises 
questions: where is the outcome of such a large amount of loans and grant aid? And, to 
what extent has it been effective? Were the funds used efficiently on proper items? Or, 
given the lack of progress, isn't it time to change policies and regulations that have been 
maintained up to now?  Today we just see a GDP growth, but poverty level has not been 
reduced below the 1995 level,  while 35-361 percent of total urban population is poor2 
and another significant portion of population is close to the poverty line.  Also, a high 
level of unemployment, low quality of health and education services, unfavorable 
business environment, remoteness, inadequacy of financial sources and human 
resources- all cause a massive migration of rural citizens to urban areas in search of a 
better life. But this massive migration would not be considered as a problem if the 
immigrants could  find employment and better living conditions in urban areas.   
Migration patterns suggest forward another question: Could they have benefited more 
and achieved better results if policies and regulations were different from what we have 
now? Even though the Government of Mongolia started to adopt and implement a 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth Strategy in cooperation with the World Bank 
in order to solve the recent issues of  these socioeconomic problems, another question 
was raised on Mongolia's ability to create development pathways without the debt 
burden (of ODA loans) increasing year by year. These and other questions show that 
there is a necessity to study the issue and make necessary changes. 
                       
1 Human Development Report of Mongolia 2003 
2
Average monthly consumption  up to 15180 MNT     - very poor 
   15180-25300 MNT     - poor 
   23501-40480 MNT       - non poor or average income 
     higher          - rich  as classified in the human development report "Urban and rural 
disparities" written in the framework of "Poverty research and employment facilitation" project implemented by UNDP.  
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Therefore, the objective of this research is to help policy makers to accept the above 
necessities and change their policies and regulation for receiving and utilizing ODA.  
  Research  
  
2.1.1 Research purpose  
 
The main purpose of this research is to study how the ODA that Mongolia received from 
donor countries and international organizations in recent years contributed to its general 
economic development, and particularly development in rural areas of the country.  We 
also derive policy recommendations on Mongolia might better receive and use the ODA 
further, on the basis of the research findings.  
 
In order to achieve the main objective , we tried to implement a set of activities in 
following phases:   
·  Studying system of ODA receiving policies and regulations of our 
country; 
·  Determining accuracy of ODA information;  
·  Identifying how accessible is ODA in rural areas and how it contributed 
to the rural development in rural areas; 
·  Drawing policy recommendation on how to improve policies and 
regulations on receiving ODA on the basis of advantages and disadvantages 
identified from the above framework;  
  
 
2.1.2 Terminological concepts of the research 
 
À) Since the research was conducted under title "Effectiveness of ODA on rural 
development", I aimed to focus it on rural areas. But the research concept "RURAL" 
refers to only aimag centers (in some cases soum centers with more than 15 thousands of 
population) and includes nomadic herdsmen that live on nomadic livestock breeding 
only if they were closely connected to the urban centers. In other words, it refers to 
aimag centers except for Ulaanbaatar. Here I should mention several reasons for this 
selection: 
 
- According to the "Human Development Report of Mongolia 
2003", poverty level is relatively higher (39.4%) in urban areas than 
in rural areas.  The poverty level in aimag centers reached 45.13 
percent of total population by 1998; 
 
- On the other hand, by developing aimag centers, living standards 
of total population residing in the aimag territory shall be improved. 
They will be able to meet their basic needs from aimag centers or the 
nearest urban areas, thereby reduces their dependence only on 
Ulaanbaatar;   
 
- In order to create favorable market environment and deliver high-
quality social services, including health and education services to 
rural population, we need to focus on aimag centers and rural 
residential centers at first; 
                       
3 Living Standard Measurement Survey 1998 
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B) I also included the concept "GROWTH" considering the POVERTY shall be reduced 
by facilitating growth. In recent years, majority of ODA has been granted for the 
poverty reduction purposes. If we detail those measures, most of them, besides measures 
of health and education, were directed toward generating overall economic growth from 
grassroots level of households and cooperatives,  including  creation of independent 
income sources, business education and business entrepreneurship, but not toward 
meeting temporary needs of foods, clothes etc.  Therefore, I intended to see the research 
from an angle of economic growth. 
 
 
2.1.3 Scale and methodology of the research   
 
In terms of policy and regulation, the research covered all ODA that Mongolia received 
nationwide. And in terms of effectiveness, I sought to reflect its contributions to rural 
development and socioeconomic spheres in a fairly detailed way. I also tried to see the 
research from several different positions: 
· From the position of Mongolian Government- how and by what policy does 
it receive and use ODA;   
· From the position of donor countries and international organizations – how 
do they grant ODA in terms of their policies and regulations as well as 
linkage with policies of Mongolian Government;  
· From the focal position of local community – how do rural people benefit 
from the above aid?  
 
I aimed to find key answers to the main research theme from these position and 
personally visited Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor, Selenge, Dornod, Khentii, Khovd and 
Zavkhan aimags to conduct field researches.  
 
In the framework of this research, I met to exchange opinions with more than 400 
individuals including those from civil service, public sector, private business sector and 
project implementing unit as well as ordinary citizens and local residents. Besides, I 
surveyed their opinion using questionnaires prepared in two different forms: one for 
local administration officers and civil servant and one for local citizens and businessmen. 
The research was conducted in two ways: personal interviews/field visits and 
questionnaire. I classified participants of the research by their production, service and 
business types as shown on the Appendix 1.  
 
 
2.1.4 ODA research studies and issues for further study  
 
A. Current research studies 
 
Internationally, a large number of research studies about ODA exist. One of those 
research studies, perhaps the one covering the broadest scale and contained considerably 
well-done policy research, was a study, "Assessing Aid", conducted by the World Bank, 
which covered over 50 countries or aid beneficiaries that received ODA for the last 30 
years. I broadly used this survey in comparing Mongolian situation with other countries.  
 
But, independent research materials, conclusions and recommendations on ODA 
effectiveness and its improvement that specifically focused on Mongolia were very few. 
Such specific reports include:  
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- Research report "Recommendations on improvement of foreign aid 
management and coordination"- prepared by research team of the 
Mongolian Society of Irkutsk Economic University in the framework of 
the UNDP-based project "Support to Coordination of External 
Development Resources”, 2002. 
 
- "Economic Growth of Mongolia and Some Issues to Accelerate the 
Growth" - Academician T.Dorj's speech presented to the First Summit on 
National Productivity in 2002.  
 
- Human Development Report of Mongolia - 2003.  
  
B. Issues for further study:  
 
I propose following issues to be studied further: 
  
- ODA conditions proposed by donors at international level and consult the 
Government about options to relieve such conditions; 
 
- Main criteria of project qualifications in countries which used ODA most 
efficiently for accelerating their growth and development, in terms of ODA 
policies, institutional structures and technical and economic feasibility 
requirements; 
 
- Whether the equipments and facilities supplied by projects implemented by 
ODA, especially from grant aid, are used for their intended purposes, whether 
the personnel work by in their areas of professional training, whether the project 
established structures, systems, and project activities are maintained for the 
intended purposes; 
 
- Identify or study what percent of ODA continues to run and gives targeted 
outcomes or how many percent of them was short-lived and why they stopped 
their operations. By this research, 17% of all respondents replied that they could 
run their operations fully, in some cases partly, after the end of project outcome, 
23% of them replied they couldn't run further and rest of 60% answered, "don't 
know". Therefore, it is important to study continuance of foreign aid projects 
and identify what changes of policy and regulation need to be done; 
 
- Need to conduct a survey on prices of goods, products and services supplied by 
ODA. Since the officers received foreign aid products complain a lot that the 
contract prices are too high, we need to study and develop proposal to regulate 
supply policies of aid products.  
 
- It is a common issue that the foreign consultants cost too high. Here we need to 
study the issue and develop methodologies and recommendations for further 
actions.   
 
2.1.5 Problems faced during the research  
 
Some problems faced during the research are described below: 
 
·  It was difficult to get information from central government organizations 
and ministries.  Specifically, the research was mainly conducted in previous 
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months of the election when the information collection was very difficult because 
the MOFE and other ministries had taken preventive position not to give out any 
information. (Apparently, there was a ministry directive that officially warned the 
officers not to disclose such information, in order to avoid possible criticism). 
Also such a "state of alert" could be observed commonly at donor project 
implementation units located at ministries.   That is, there was a common trend to 
"own" information. However, information  they own was not so complete and in 
some cases contrasting with each other. 
 
· Also in some cases officers of ministries and government organizations 
showed casual and indifferent attitudes to researcher, by not coming to or 
avoiding appointments (making excuses concerning their work overload) and by 
treating them as university students that collect materials for writing school work 
projects. 
 
·  Assessing effectiveness of ODA was made more difficult because 
responses from all levels of government officers were cautious, reflecting a self-
protecting attitude, avoiding accountability, and providing wishy-washy answers 
or general answers, such as "overall, it was effective".    
 
· ODA awareness was very low among aimag and soum citizens who mostly 
understand ODA to be humanitarian aid and name all assistance simply as 
"project". Also, aimag administration officers called it "project and programme" 
including government programs and foreign aid into one concept. Therefore, it 
was difficult to understand them separately. 
 
· Some efficiency and growth indicators taken to measure rural 
development, such as number of taxpayers or tax income, were no longer usable 
for the purpose because of regular policy shifts, changes in the status of business 
entities, and transfers between local/central budget taxpayers. Numbers of aimag 
taxpayers issued by aimag taxation offices are shown in the Appendix 2.  
 
Chapter 5 shows policy recommendations drawn from the 
research result, Chapter 3 describes background 
information such as current ODA policies and regulations, 
amount and scale of ODA utilization, and Chapter 4 
describes ODA effectiveness on rural development. 
 
 
 
THREE.  ODA IN MONGOLIA 
 
3.1. Amount, scale and possible outcome of ODA  
 
Using main indicators that show economic and aid dependence rates of a country, I 
compared ODA status of Mongolia with over 50 developing countries, including East 
European and Central Asian countries similarly developing in transition from centrally 
planned to market economy and other developing and less developed countries received 
large amounts of loans and aid or shifted their development status in the last 30 years. 
Mongolia received and used in total 2.5 billion US$ of ODA between 1991-2002. Each 
year Mongolia had received 824  US$ of ODA per capita, by the average of 1993-2001 
                       
4 http//www.oecd.org/statistics and World Development Indicators 2000, 2002 and 2003.  
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and by this indicator, Mongolia was ranked in the second place among the world 
countries (not including Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 
Chart 1. 
Chart 1. ODA per capita /Average of 1991-2002/   
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Source: http://www.oecd.org/statistics and World Development Indicators 2000, 2002 and 2003 
  
Each year Mongolia received ODA equals to 17-32 percent of its annual GDP (21.7% - 
World Development Indicators 2000, 2002 and 2003) in average and today it is one of 5 
countries highly dependent on aid.   
 
             Table 1. ODA, Mongolia received between 1991-2002                                                                                                  
/in million USD/  
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
ODA  258 141 195 221 215 196 244 207 238 174 213 174 
GDP(by 
nominal 
rate) 
473 146 493 785 1227 1179 1054 972 906 970 1014 1107 
GDP (by the 
rate of 1995 
) 
1217 1101 1068 1093 1162 1189 1237 1280 1322 1336 1349 1404 
ODA/GDP 
(by nominal 
rate) 
55% 97% 40% 28% 18% 17% 23% 21% 26% 18% 21% 16% 
ODA/GDP 
(by the rate 
of 1995 ) 
21% 13% 18% 20% 19% 17% 20% 16% 18% 13% 16% 16% 
Source: 1. Ministry of Finance and Economy, Mongolia, ‘Effectiveness & Contributions of ODA for 
Mongolia”. Mongolia Consultative Group Meeting. November 19-21, 2003. Tokyo, Japan 
2. National Statistical Office, Statistical bulletin 1989-2002 
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3. Third year result of joint research project on economic reform and development "Using ODA effectively in 
Mongolia", August 15-16, 1997 
 
 
Table 2 shows aid dependence rate of Mongolia by the average of 1991-2002, as 
published on the book World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Aid dependence rate of Mongolia  
/by the average of 1991-2002/  
 
Indicators Average From the 
top 
1. Average amount of ODA per capita (USD/year)    
(not including Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
82.0 3 
2.  ODA/GDP (%) 17.0 4 
3. ODA/ Total investment (%) 75.1 6 
4. ODA/ Import (%)  31.2 5 
5. ODA/ Government budget expenditure (%)    83.0 2 
 
The above table shows that Mongolia is among the world's leading countries in terms of 
ODA received per capital. Here alerts that it turns to be a country with vulnerable 
economy overly dependent on foreign aid.  
 
Being dependent on aid means the government of the country is no longer able to 
perform its main functions such as basic social services without foreign aid resources and 
consultation.  Here includes countries that receive aid equals to 10 or more percent of 
their GDP. Number of such countries reached over 30 by 2000.  Aid dependence is 
measured by aid "intensity". Statistical research on the indicators of many countries 
showed that very strong negative relationship existed between aid intensity and quality 
of governance. That is, aid intensity was adversely affected by poor quality of 
governance. Also it was proved that continuous receipt of aid for a long term is a factor 
of worsening governance and institutional structure and slowing development.  Even 
though Mongolia has not received aid for a long time, the amount equals to 20% of 
GDP suggests likelihood of being in trouble.    
 
On the other hand, there is a necessity to check whether Mongolia's society and economy 
developed rapidly as its ODA rank would suggest, as one of the top recipients in the 
world. In order to make this check, I used as a basic benchmark the "Assessing Aid" 
policy research (1998) conducted by the World Bank, which covered over 50 countries or 
aid beneficiaries that received ODA for the last 30 years. As summarized by this research 
report, ODA brings high level of benefits to countries with well-defined socioeconomic 
policies, sound organization of institutional structures and governments that work 
lawfully toward providing better government service or consistently make efforts to keep 
the service as  good as it should be. For instance, the report defined that it is possible for 
a country, received ODA equals to 1% of its GDP and used it properly as mentioned 
above, to attain following outcomes: 
· 2.2-3.7 % increase in GDP per capita  
· 0.5%  increase in GDP growth  
· 1% poverty reduction 
· Attract private investment equals to 1.9% of GDP 
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· 1% reduction in infant mortality   
 
Examples of countries that successfully used ODA for overcoming crisis and achieving a 
high level of development include Korea in 1960s, Indonesia in 1970s, Bolivia and 
Ghana in 1980s, and both Uganda and Vietnam in 1990s.  
 
But, on the other hand, countries like Congo and Tanzania that received billions of USD 
of ODA for several decades could not achieve any development or progress because of 
their weak policies and regulations, technical or managerial incompetence, and 
corruption.  Instead of progress, ODA loans left these countries among the most heavily 
indebted poor countries. Tanzania was granted 2 billion USD of ODA for 20 years, only 
for the purpose of road construction. But it was ineffective because the constructed 
roads were eroded and damaged quicker than the construction could take place, because 
of a lack of necessary repair works.  
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned World Bank research summary, I estimated some 
indicators to check what levels Mongolia's major socioeconomic indicators might have 
reached if Mongolia had used properly the ODA received between 1991-2002. According 
to my estimation, it was possible for Mongolia's GDP per capita to reach 4700.00 USD, 
instead of the current (approximately) 400.00 USD. By the most modest estimation, 
taking into account the vast territory and scarce population factors that would adversely 
effect ODA effectiveness, a reasonable expectation for Mongolia's GDP per capita 
should be at least 1700.00 USD. That is, I assumed here that our GDP per capita was 
likely to increase by only 1 percent, which is a half of the minimum possible growth, as 
result of the ODA equals to 1% of our GDP.  
                                                                           Chart 2.   
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Poverty level has been officially measured since 1995.  However, highly efficient use of 
the ODA we received since that time would have reduced the poverty level from 36.3% to 
21.6.   
                                                                            Chart 3.  
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Moreover, the chart below shows a comparison that indicates real investment would 
have reached the level- 9 times higher than the current level.  
                                                                                               
                                                                                                     Chart 4.  
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In other words, it was possible for Mongolia's GDP per capita to be some 3 to 10 times 
higher than today's actual level, for the poverty level to be reduced down to 21.6%, and infant 
mortality to be lowered by 3 to 4 times from its current level, reaching 7 per 1000 live births. 
Also it was estimated that the domestic investment would have been 9 times higher than the 
current level. 
 
 
3.2. Current policies and regulations of receiving ODA 
 
Main document on foreign aid policy and regulation is the Law of Mongolia on Foreign 
Aid Regulations, enacted in June 2003 and other documents include Law on 
International Treaties, annual state budget laws of Mongolia, "Procedure for regulating 
official development loans and aid the Government of Mongolia receives from foreign 
countries and international organizations" approved by the Government Resolution No. 
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93 of 1999 and "Procedure on Foreign Aid Coordination Council and its rules", revised 
by the Government Resolution No. 152 of 2000.    
 
Although a new law on foreign aid regulation was adopted, the above-mentioned 
procedures approved by the government resolutions, which were basic regulatory 
documents before the law, are still valid. So it is  necessary to amend those procedures in 
line with the new law. 
  
According to the new law, foreign assistance shall: 
- Be closely linked with medium-term development strategy, long run 
strategy and state budget investment plans;  
- Regard common interests of the country;  
- Have concessional terms if it is a loan;  
- Have low total costs of consultancy service; 
- Reflect production and repair costs in technical and economic terms as 
well as technological, socioeconomic and environmental requirements and 
loan efficiency calculations in the feasibility study, according to relevant 
legal acts.  
- A project loan has a basic requirement that total domestic funding shall 
include domestic tax relief and exemption as well as costs of domestically 
supplied products and services. 
 
 Although the above requirements were generally reflected in effective government 
resolutions enforced before enactment of the new law, it is  doubtful to conclude that  
both so far implemented or under implementation projects could meet above 
requirements being truly economically efficient.   For example, Dornod thermal power 
station was repaired with 11.6 million Euros of project loan. Today this power station 
operates smoothly, but it uses only up to 20 percent of its capacity due to low market 
demand and still receives subsidy from state budget. Therefore, we should review 
whether its economic efficiency was correctly calculated, whether the reality was 
reflected in medium-term development strategy of the project and whether future  
demand  and supply of  the region was  estimated . Similarly, we need to review technical 
and economic feasibilities of large-scale investment projects and  establish economic 
efficiency criteria for each stage of decision-making and evaluation for further projects 
and measures lawfully. Moreover, ongoing monitoring on project implementation and 
follow-up performance evaluation mechanisms need to be reflected in relevant laws. 
 
According to the law, central public administration organization in charge of foreign aid 
affairs shall have duties to ”... review projects received from ministries in line with 
medium-term development strategy, far-reaching objective, state budget, investment 
plan, overall significance, socioeconomic effectiveness  as well as policies and regulations 
of partners and submit to the Cabinet for discussion and decision-making". Besides, the 
law states that it has the authority to conduct technical and economic feasibility studies 
and analysis on programs, projects and measures implemented by foreign aid. Here we 
can see that this organization is a sole authority that makes decision to spend ODA on 
efficient projects. However, whether or not to undertake an economic feasibility study or 
estimation is a decision left  to the organization since that action is not mandatory. The 
law says that the central public administration organization in charge of foreign aid 
affairs, shall review project proposals from sectoral ministries, submit the review for 
Cabinet discussion, propose supported projects to donors according to relevant 
procedures, and sign a contract jointly with project applicant. On the other hand,  the 
Parliament is authorized to ratify loan agreements. Diagram 1 shows how procedures to 
receive foreign aid are reflected in the Law on foreign aid regulation. 
 15 
 
                                                                                                                            Diagram 1. 
 
 
 
Above procedures shows only the stage where the proposal has reached government 
level, therefore the diagram does not illustrate how local and grassroots level initiatives 
shall reach government level passing other preliminary stages. Even at the upper level, 
procedures were not legislated to be simple and easy. Although the law stated that the 
Cabinet should discuss all foreign aid proposals, currently practiced actual procedures 
were quite different from the above, in which MOFE receives project proposals from 
sectoral ministries, reviews whether they meet cooperation program directions of the 
donor and submits to the Foreign Aid Coordination Council (FACC) for discussion. 
Although FACC was re-established by Government Resolution No. 152 of year 2000, 
the structure was not reflected in the new law. FACC aims to coordinate efficient use of 
ODA and foreign aid related activities and its membership includes the Minister of 
Finance and Economy as a chairman and other members including Vice Ministers, the 
First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mongolia and the Chief of Cabinet Secretariat.   
It makes decisions to submit some projects for Cabinet discussion, some projects to 
return, and some to send directly to donors. Even it is not legally binding, FACC is 
accustomed to negotiating contracts on the loan projects appraised by Cabinet 
discussion, and then the SGH  ratifies them automatically. Such practice of approval 
after discussion is good, but the automatic approval of all loan projects raises doubt 
whether the SGH makes decision after scrutinizing their economic efficiency, 
significance and effect on development or just approves them directly without taking 
responsibility because of political pressure and under procedural constraint from donors.       
 
 
Sectoral 
Ministry 
Central public 
administration 
organization in 
charge of 
foreign aid 
Cabinet 
Supported projects Central public 
administration 
organization in 
charge of foreign 
aid together with 
sectoral ministries 
 
Cabinet member in  charge of foreign 
aid (except specially authorized by the 
Cabinet) 
Project proposal  
 
State Great Hural  
(ratifies only loan agreements) 
 
Sectoral ministry 
and implementing 
agencies 
Diagram on procedures to receive ODA 
 
Donor 
MOFA 
Reviewed project 
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Also the central government authority in charge of foreign aid affairs is legislated to 
have a duty to maintain foreign aid registration and database. We should appreciate that 
Treasury Department of  MOFE completely maintains compiled registration of ODA 
loans along with detailed repayment schedules. Loans are registered to the above 
information database on their starting day of disbursement. Although the MOFE  
Department of Economic Cooperation Management and Coordination is responsible for 
maintaining grant aid database,  what they have done was almost incomplete and not 
regularly updated. Information of this database radically contrasted with information 
received from donors and in many cases grant aid  information was  not reflected in full 
programs and projects and some of them had different names. For example; 
 
USAID-based:  
- Agricultural Bank Reform project,  
- Competitiveness Initiative project  
ADB-based  
- ÒÀ- 2720 "Improving Banking System Control and 
Restructuring" project with funding of  1.0 million USD 
- ÒÀ -3208 Technical Assistance Loan for Improving Banking 
System Restructuring with funding of 220.0 thousand USD 
 
Unlike loans, disbursement and utilization of grant aid do not flow through single 
window, so that MOFE has little chance to compile all of them into one integrated 
database. 
  
However, in comparison to previous years when there was no permanent structure of 
coordinating ODA affairs where several ministries involved concurrently, significant 
progresses of aid coordination have been made in the last four years. The new law 
somewhat eliminated power conflicts among ministries and their attempts to handle aid 
affairs individually, in particularly the coordination of a development loan is now being 
handled by one corporate hand.  
 
 Although the MOFE, central government authority in charge of aid affairs, has few number 
of staffs, they bear a big responsibility of handling major development policy issues of 
Mongolia including national economic development strategy; budget policy, their planning 
and implementation; and ODA coordination. Besides, they take responsibility of organizing 
implementations, directly and indirectly. Therefore, it makes the ministry too overloaded and 
unable to perform its main functions and concentrate on its main objectives properly. Due to 
their aspiration to cover budget losses by any means, today the MOFE turned to be a ministry 
that tends to look everything through a window of budget, acquiesces any financial terms of 
ODA with that purpose, and focuses their attention on raising budget income According to the 
law and other procedures that used to be effective, the MOFE is obliged to conduct economic 
feasibility study and analysis on each loan request or proposal, but basically they do not 
perform this function in practice. It is not reasonable to assume that the ministry performs 
everything with its few staffs, including those works such as preparing materials for annual 
donors' meeting, reviewing and scrutinizing each projects proposed for approximately 300 
million USD of loans and aid pledged by the meeting, estimating their economic efficiency 
and receiving actual funding officially, besides handling their function to record and update 
the database of loans and grant aid.  In other words, today staff in ministries just work on 
daily routine matters, but they lack functions to perform socio-economic efficiency analyses 
and feasibility studies on national-level projects and measures and provide economically 
justifiable consulting to the Cabinet. 
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Besides, previous studies show that  professional officers of core ministries have low level 
of capacity and stability. Despite a law on civil servants exists effective,  here we should 
be critical that the law is not always obeyed.  Moreover, work lags have been created due 
to incapacity of illegally recruited personnel just aimed to study abroad in developed 
countries under government scholarship, but  unable to perform functions stated by 
laws. Especially for ODA, such illegal practices  create grounds  for implementing 
inefficient loan projects, further increasing budget debts and creating budget overload. 
 
Although the main policy document- Law on foreign aid regulation- stated that a 
number of regulatory documents needs to be developed, so far none of them was 
officially issued, but still in their draft phases at ministries. For instance, 
 
- Procedure on registering foreign aid granted in the form of goods and 
products 
- Procedure on domestic on-lending of foreign aid resources and its contract 
form 
- Procedure on project implementation report 
- Medium-term program on receiving foreign aid 
- Procedure and guideline on requesting necessary documents and materials 
from relevant bodies 
- Procedure on reporting storage, protection, usage and expenditure of 
foreign aid resources 
- Procedure on creation and use of foreign aid records and information 
database 
 
In early 1990s, foreign aid affairs were basically coordinated by donors' management, 
but today it is  appreciable that some sectoral ministries started to make attempts to do 
own coordination. But the outcomes have not been significantly effective yet.  It is  
common for several donor projects to include a part of similar activities  reflected in little 
different ways.  For example, well drilling and repairing activity was reflected in different 
ways in 8-9 projects and programs including Agricultural Development Project (ADB), 
Sustainable Livelihood Support Project (WB), Rural Poverty Reduction Project (IFAD), 
Sustainable Pastureland Management Project (UNDP, the Netherlands), and other 
World Vision, ADRA and JICA projects. However, initiative for joint harmonization 
activities to improve aid outcome and effectiveness was raised at the Donor Meeting, 
held in in November, 2003 in Tokyo and started to make attempts in some sectoral 
levels. For instance, a working group for studying possibilities to incorporate multi-
source financing of well drilling and repairing activities was established at the MOFA 
and they have produced a report.  This is a quite positive step toward improving 
coordination. In restoring over 30 thousand wells and building new ones, the probability 
of overlapping is low, though medium and long-term efficiency results from 
implementing projects under one incorporated coordination  shall be increased, as we 
also need to coordinate their further repairing services and pastureland management 
issues. Say that MoFE  coordinates its activities with donor countries and organizations 
by each cooperation field, but the ministry uses it mainly for project selection purposes. 
In terms of territorial coordination, they started to make some attempts. A clear example 
is, they agreed on concepts and directions to cooperate with Germany and indicated that 
the cooperation shall concentrate territorially on Tuv and Selenge region as well as 
Zavkhan aimag.        
 
Over 30% of total ODA and almost a half of total  concessional loans were spent only on 
infrastructure including road construction, energy sector restoration, communication 
sector development and improvement of public utilities, which accorded to the policies 
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of several governments aimed to develop  hard infrastructure for economic development 
since 1990s. In this field, policies and implementations have been well linked. As result,  
today coverage of telecomunication services has been improved radically and all forms 
of telecommunication such as telephone or mobile communication and internet 
connection have been completely introduced at aimag and city level and even in some 
cases reached soum level. Also distance education facilities have been connecting aimags 
and cities.  Moreover, almost all aimags except for three aimags have been connected to 
central power line, which means preliminary conditions for production and business 
development have been created in aimags.  Large scale road construction works have 
improved roads between three big cities and some central aimags, thereby undoubtedly 
accelerates economic turnover of the region.       
 
However, what we undervalued here are the industrial and agricultural sectors that 
produce over 50% of our GDP,  which have used 13% of total ODA and merely 15% of 
total loans. In contrast, education, health and social security sectors received more ODA 
than these sectors, which does not accord to government policies for growth generation, 
poverty reduction and export promotion  
 
The central government authority in charge of foreign aid affairs, sectoral ministries and 
aimag and capital city Governors shall monitor implementation of approved projects, as 
stated in law. Officials of ministries, agencies and local administration bodies say that 
they exercise control on project financing, but I did not feel such control in reality. 
Donors control implementations to certain extents according to their criteria, procedures 
and guidelines. From the side of Mongolia, almost no controlling system that monitors 
actual performances with systematic analyses and evaluation is available, except for 
timely responses to donors' request and concentration on expenditure of resources.   It is 
associated with fact that there are no clear performance criteria for monitoring and 
evaluation and proper monitoring mechanism. Though monitoring and evaluation 
divisions were established within ministries at the time of  previous government, so far 
they couldn't place substantial controls. For example, Monitoring and evaluation 
division of the Ministry of Infrastructure, where largest amount of ODA projects are 
implemented, does not evaluate implementing aid projects or project proposals. Even 
when they try to monitor and evaluate  one or two implemented projects, they do not 
know how to measure their performances. 
 
On the other hand, projects proposed by donors' side are often too far-sighted and use 
overly optimistic assumptions about price and tariff policies and regulations, thereby 
shows the project look efficient. But in practice, those optimist assumptions do not 
match reality, so that today there are many cases in which ODA loan investments have 
been working inefficiently.  For example,  the project investment for improving public 
utilities in five western aimags has not still yielded its economic efficiency and created 
capacity to repay loan principal and interest payments. It was socially significant project, 
but those entities had to repay the loan according to the on-lending contracts couldn't 
increase their sales tariff rates up to the level of initial project assumption and had to 
work economically inefficient.    
  
Also the World Bank loan project of 35 million USD was implemented in Baganuur coal 
mining, where 40 percent of heavy machineries supplied by the projects has been broken. 
But now the coal mining operates and supplies its products normally.  It shows that we 
also need to review how  capacity and number  of machineries and equipments selected 
by projects correlated with other factors like personnel, repair and maintenance as well 
as supply of spare parts. 
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Both project implementors and donors criticize that project effectiveness reduces as long 
as its implementation lags; and they explain it in connection with following reasons: 
  
· Government does not keep what they promised in the 
framework of projects and programs or does not hold consistent 
stance. For example, it delays finances from government 
resources, doesn't take measures to prepare in advance etc.  
· Sectoral ministries and MOFE are incapable of drafting 
projects to meet donors' requirements. They just propose 
something like a list of  wishes. 
· There is a common concept that donors shall implement 
projects themselves. 
· They do not care project outcomes, instead, put more 
importance on training, facilities and study trips. 
· There are many bureacratic stages of decision making and 
each organization throws issues to one another. Basically, all 
issues are resolved by reaching the top  level. Here wastes a lot of 
time.  
 
Official government reporting is limited by only quantitative expression of ODA in input 
stage and public reporting limited by just TV shows on signing ceremonies of received 
projects or tape cutting ceremonies for imported goods, machineries and equipments, 
running newspaper advertisement on those ceremonies for the public, while there is no 
reporting and accountability system  on actual outcomes achieved after completion of 
the projects.  For  only last two months of observation, many of such kind of ceremonial 
news appeared on TV and daily newspapers simultaneously for one day, while news on 
evaluation of actual project outcomes almost did not appear to the public.   
 
3.3 Summary 
 
Summary of current situation of ODA policies and regulations can be made in general: 
 
- Inadequate ODA  policy and regulation. National long and medium term development 
policy priorities are not clear, they cover all socioeconomic sectors and list all of them, 
and it is  not clear whether government prioritized certain issues. ODA policies and 
coordination are inadequate. Basically there is no development policy and planning on 
ODA utilization. The new law enacted in 2003 defined general foreign aid policy, stating 
"Foreign aid shall regard mid-term development strategy, long-term vision, state fiscal 
and investment plans and common national interests". Besides, the law prescribed   
common requirements for ODA projects and measures as well as authorities and duties 
of governmentc organizations in receiving and implementing ODA. However, actual 
practices  do not meet above requirements and conditions;  and government 
organizations still decide issues on ad-hoc basis, not performing their duties and 
activities properly as stated in the law. Also, lack of clearly stated direction and sectoral 
priority list on ODA utilization leads to approve projects with best solicit and political 
lobby.    On the other hand, ministries have a desire to receive foreign aid as much as 
possible and to manage its implementation by themselves, which is another factor 
influences the selection process. Initiative for donor to donor and donor to government 
coordination was frequently raised, but so far no significant outcome has been is 
achieved.  
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- Does not regard economic efficiency as a main indicator, especially for loans; Directions 
for donors' aid and cooperation are well maintained, but they are not used as a basis for 
project selection and correct estimation of economic efficiency. Since today there is 
almost no evaluation mechanism for receiving and utilised loans, still exists possibility 
for receiving economically inefficient loans further.   They seek appraisal for projects 
that show high level of social importance and indefinite economic efficiency or too far-
sighted dream of efficiency and submit  them to donors, even their economic efficiency is 
not clear. They receive loans that prioritised social services but economically ineffective 
in the near future. Large investment objects constructed and restored by loan resources 
suffer losses for several years starting from their date of operation and receive budget 
subsidies. 
 
- The Foreign Aid Coordination Council that was established to coordinate aid before 
enactment of the law (but no longer in the new law) still works to date, discusses and 
makes decisions on projects. Although officials say that this council operates now to 
facilitate Cabinet meeting; it works under influence of its members, who wanted to 
include own sectoral projects, and in some cases under manipulation and attempts of 
political officials, including MPs, who wanted to influence the decision making by misuse of 
their power, rather than really facilitating the  Cabinet meeting by screening projects 
according to their major socioeconomic effectiveness, efficiency and outcome indicators.   
 
- They overly follow interests, requirements and conditions proposed by donors and 
ready to accept any terms in case of  receiving money and finance, which accords to the 
practice that the political officials are led by their desire to obtain  as much as possible 
during their term of office. Some ministries and agencies often take initiatives to attach 
their opinion and request what they need, but they do not always succeed due to lack of 
consistent system.    
 
- Don't attach much importance to repayment- this attitude blurs future repayment 
burden and creates public awareness that all of them are grant aid; but portion of grant 
aid in ODA is too low in comparison to other low and middle income countries, instead, 
at the level of high income countries. According to "International Development 
Statistics-2004", grant aid portion in total ODA is 65-71% for low and middle-income 
countries. The portion is 57% for high-income countries, but it is 53% for Mongolia. 
Therefore, we should work toward maintaining loan and grant aid ratio of 30:70 in 
receiving ODA. 
 
- Ministries and agencies accustomed to submit a compiled list of wishes for a dare. For 
ODA loan projects, professional officers of ministries and agencies accustomed to 
submit a compiled list of wishes, rather than paying their time and effort, concentrating 
on socio-economic analyses at each level and deciding on really efficient projects to be 
submitted to upper organization. 
 
- Lack of relationship between Budget framework statement (investment program) and 
ODA. Mongolian government budget and ODA seem to relate each other only when 
some objects covered by larger ODA program or project have to be eliminated from 
budget framework statement. But it is occasional or on ad hock basis. That is, not all 
ODA programs and projects are reflected in investment plans of the budget framework 
statement. Since there is no such system to reflect them all, the MOFE's Investment 
division is incapable to handle the task due to lack of human resource.   
 
- No decision-making authority at lower levels. Local community has a common 
understanding and expectation that 'Everything comes down from above' since there is 
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no policy environment to make initiative, receive and utilise ODA. Even there were cases 
that some loan users did not know that their loans came in actually, as mentioned in the 
previous research5. In other words, all issues must reach the top level in order to be 
resolved. 
 
- Inadequate and nontransparent information.  ODA information is nontransparent to the 
public. Such information and reports officially exchanged between government 
organizations and donors are incomplete and measured only by total amounts of  
received resources. Donor consultants cited examples that in some cases the ministries 
deliberately conceal information or accidentally mislead donors, resulting in a waste of 
time and resources on overlapped activities.  A complex performance-based system of 
information and reporting has not been created yet. 
 
- - No controlling system at all levels. Mongolian government, 
ministries, implementing agencies and aid recipients all have no 
effective control at all levels and for all stages of implementation, 
from project initiative to completion as well as follow up stages.  
 
 
FOUR. ODA ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 ODA projects and programms in rural areas 
 
Defining ODA contribution to rural development was problematic, with very little 
identification. Since significant number of projects aim at nationwide, macro-level 
reforms and restructuring, it is  not reasonable to consider them non-rural. Also, we 
cannot isolate banking and financial sector capacity building and their service quality 
improvement projects from rural development. But, if we just exclude few large scale 
targeted projects and general-purpose reform projects such as aid in the form of food 
and goods, World Bank project "Improving public utilities in UB city", ADB project 
"Housing finance", "Buyant Ukhaa airport", which are implemented only in 
Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan and Erdenet from the main database, and pick up the projects 
closely associated with rural areas; then 58.8% of total loans and 38.8% of total grant aid 
in our totally disbursed ODA were utilized in rural areas. (Table 3)    
 
Table 3. Share of ODA amounts & projects associated with rural areas. 
 
By volume of funding  
Loan Grant aid 
Total ODA (million USD)  1255 1221 
ODA utilization in 1991-1993  269.62 219.96 
ODA utilization in 1994-2002 985.38 1001.4 
Percent of ODA disbursement for projects and activities 
associated with rural areas  
58.8 38.8 
 
The above estimation is based on government database of ODA loans and grant aid and 
covered projects directly and indirectly associated with rural areas and implemented in 
1994-2002. But here I did not include projects completed before 1996 and non-relevant 
loans and grant aid as well as emergency and food assistance.   
                       
5  Research report named "Recommendations on improvement of foreign aid management and coordination"- 
prepared by research team of the Mongolian Association of Irkutsk Economic University in the framework of the 
UNDP-based project " Support to Coordination of External Development Resources”,  2002. 
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From above table we can assume that significant portion of total received ODA was 
disbursed in rural areas. However, it was impossible to estimate number of projects and 
measures and amount of aid disbursement  by each aimag or local area.  
 
Out of aimags covered by the research, Governor's Office of Selenge aimag took first 
initiative of organizing information exchange meeting on foreign aid projects 
implemented in the aimag, which was also supported by the Open Society Forum that 
organizes this research. The meeting, held on May 29 of this year, was an effective 
measure for exchanging information at aimag level and increasing participants' 
awareness on effects and importance of foreign aid to local development. As result of 
this measure, we produced a "List of foreign aid projects implemented in Selenge aimag", 
shown in the Appendix 4, which can be starting point of having complete database on 
foreign aid projects implemented in the aimag level. The list gives opportunity to see 
generally what kind of projects and measures are implemented in local level of aimags.  
 
Though we made attempts to draw a complete list of projects implemented in Selenge 
aimag, it was impossible to express them in their volumes of funding. Therefore, we had 
to use a press release issued by the Governor of Zavkhan aimag, who said that the aimag 
implemented in total 15-16 million USD of projects for the last four years. If we use this 
amount as an aimag average, it was estimated roughly that total number of 21 aimags 
had received approximately 300-400 million USD of ODA in the last four years, which 
was fairly close to the above amount of documentation.    
 
When we analyzed activity components, especially for poverty reduction projects 
implemented in rural areas, most of them were physical and intellectual forms of 
investments aimed at income generation, improvement of business environment and 
creation of small and medium business activities. That is, most of the foreign aid 
activities6 were directed to the securing "growth" that we mentioned earlier in the project 
terminology section.  
 
Basically, none of local administration and private sector people has a belief that aimag 
or local initiatives can be realized and implemented. There are two reasons: first, poor 
capacity to write a project in rural areas, second, no mechanism to make local initiatives 
agenda for upper decision making.     
 
 
4.2 ODA effectiveness in rural areas 
 
In order to find answers to this question "How rural development has improved in these 
years?" I personally visited seven aimags, namely Uvurkhangai, Bayankhongor, Selenge, 
Dornod, Khentii, Khovd and Zavkhan, to conduct field research on ODA utilization 
and its effectiveness on rural development. 
 
Since there is a common awareness that aid comes "down from the top", rural people 
basically have no sense of repayment except for one or two aimag administration 
officers.  
 
                       
6 These foreign aid projects excluded those projects ended by 1996 and started from 2002; supported import of 
goods and payment balance; addressed to Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan, Erdenet cities including Buyant Ukhaa 
airport loan; and other general-purpose, structural reform projects covered whole national socioeconomic 
spheres.  
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Rural people generally understand ODA and other foreign aid in one concept of 
humanitarian aid. And they comment that local administration people, especially soum 
and bagh governors and their close relatives, benefit from the aid.  
 
According to survey result based on question “How ODA affected improvement of 
citizens' living standards?”, over 80% of aimag and local administration officers and 10% 
of businessmen and NGO officers evaluated that it affected positively, while local 
residents answered, "don't know at all" or "no difference". They criticized, "People say 
that aid come, but actually local administration people take all themselves", specially 
addressing to bagh, khoroo and soum governors.  
 
Generally, the survey result on whether foreign aid had positive contributions to the 
aimag and local  development shows that 44% of survey participants answered "don't 
know", 18.3% of them evaluated that "they had good effects", 15.9% of them responded 
"to some extent", and 21.7% of them evaluated critically.  
                                                                                                                            Chart 5. 
 
 
To the question, "Could you run foreign aid projects effectively and continiously after 
the end of project implementation? ", only 6% of respondents answered 'YES', while 
60.2% of them answered 'DON’T KNOW' and 23.2% of them responded 'NO'. 
 
If we list the projects actually felt and known well today by local people, according to 
their interviews and responses to our questionnaire, they numbered over 40, but few of 
them were popular or commonly known and felt by local citizens. Here they are shown 
in the following table.  
  
Table 4. 10 projects most popular among rural people 
   
Name of project Donor country or 
organization 
1. Sustainable livelihoods project  World Bank 
2. Gobi initiative project USA 
3. Regional development program and other projects -1991  World Vision  
4. Education and information projects  Soros Foundation 
5. Reproductive health FRG 
6. Grassroots  Japan 
7. Health sector development program I & II ADB 
8. Provincial town urban service improvement project  ADB 
9. Children's education projects Save the Children 
UK  
10. Agricultural sector development  ADB 
 
Assessing contributions of ODA projects implemented in your aimag ? ? 
 ? Dont know 
44% 
Well  
н ?л?  
18% 
Ш ??critisized 
22% 
 
To certain 
level 16% 
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Despite a few projects mentioned in the above table could actually reach their targets in 
rural areas, it was observed that some other projects such as USAID-based "Gobi 
initiative" project, the World Vision programs, renewable energy projects and measures 
of German Technical Cooperation Agency, and projects of Norwegian aid organization, 
contributed in improving livelihoods and economies of rural population.      
 
Also, I observed that mostly central project offices coordinated project implementations 
in rural areas and the full amount of resources allocated from centers did not always 
reach their rural targets.            
 
Only 2% of rural people and businessmen participated in the questionnaire responded 
that they were involved in ODA projects and programs; and 6% out of 98% of those who 
had never been involved, answered that they tried to be involved but failed. There is only 
little chance to be involved in small projects announced through the Sustainable 
livelihood project. Therefore, it was possible to conclude from the above situation that a 
very little part of ODA projects and activities went to private sector, where rural 
businessmen had no access at all.   
 
The above ratio was similarly maintained in their participation to foreign aid project and 
programme tenders, as shown in the Chart 6.  
                                                                                                                          Chart 6. 
 
 
Rural businessmen all criticize that "When commercial banks provide on-lending from 
the ODA concessional loans with original 0.5-1% annual interest rate to rural 
businessmen at commercial loan rates or too high annual interest rates of 30-42% and 
reduces the ODA loan terms of 20-30 years down to less than one year, thereby the ODA 
loan loses its meaning of ODA and makes rural businesses impossible to run". On the 
other hand, amount of the loan is very small, as if it was lent only for short-term 
livelihood, but not for conducting larger scale of businesses.  
 
The majority of civil servants interviewed or who responded to our questionnaire 
expressed their opinion that a better use of ODA would be in social sectors, especially in 
education sector. But 90% of businessmen preferred to lend more ODA loans directly to 
local businessmen with low interest rate and longer term, which would be important for 
developing local production and services and improving repayment for businessmen. 
Although rural businessmen did not deny spending ODA in social sectors, they 
concluded that local social sectors could be improved by local economic development if 
we first invest in economic sector, in particularly the private sector. 
Have you been involved in  ODA? 
Have you participated in the ODA   tender? 
Yes No 
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
Involvement in Foreign aid or tenders 
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42 percent of total rural ODA was utilized in hard infrastructure such as road 
construction, telecommunication and energy sectors, 19 percent in social sectors such as 
human resource development, health and social welfare, while only 8 percent of them 
allocated in agricultural sector and just 3 percent in industry.  Table 5 and Chart 7 
illustrate this allocation.  
 
Table .  ODA utilized in rural areas- by main sectors7  
 
SECTOR  LOAN  GRANT AID TOTAL 
Social sectors (human resource 
development, education, health, 
social welfare) 
7% 36% 19% 
Infrastructure 66% 6% 42% 
Agriculture  7% 11% 8% 
Industry  3% 4% 3% 
Banking & finance  11% 2% 8% 
Other  6% 41% 20% 
 
 
Total ODA utulized in rural areas - by sectors         Chart 7 
 
 
The situation inevitably led me to examine how is the ODA utilization in infrastructure 
as a basic condition for securing growth and in health and education sectors as indirect 
factors for securing growth in local aimags.  
  
4.2.1 ODA effectiveness in rural infrastructure  
 
People did not always remember investments and aid directed to infrastructure, social 
sectors and intellectual capacity building fields when they asked.  But when we remind 
them and ask how did they affect you, they just remembered how they were before and 
started to feel actual outcomes. In other words, ODA contribution to road construction 
and power sector had already started to show their effects on people's livings and people 
got used to them forgetting past problems, thereby no longer regarded them in their 
evaluation. Over 30% of total ODA and over 40% of total  ODA utilized in rural areas 
were spent for this sector, as result of  infrastructural development policy that has been 
                       
7 From the list of projects directly and indirectly associated with rural areas (excluding those projects 
completed before 1996 and started from 2002, as well as urban city and special object projects) 
Social sectors  
19% 
Infrastructure 
42% 
Agriculture 
8% 
Industry 
3% 
Bank and finance 
sector 8% 
Others 
20% 
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included in the list of government priority issues for the last decade. By virtue of well 
linked policies and implementations maintained in this sector,  today coverage of 
telecomunication services has been improved radically and all forms of 
telecommunication such as telephone or mobile communication and internet connection 
have been completely introduced at aimag and city level and even in some cases reached 
soum level. Also distance education facilities have been connecting aimags and cities.  
Moreover, almost all aimags except for three aimags have been connected to central 
power line, which means preliminary conditions for production and business 
development have been created in aimags.  Also in some aimags, namely in Zavkhan 
aimag, a German aid project, Japanese and Chinese aid provided with renewable energy 
sources for about 30 percent of rural herdsmen and thereby increased their number of 
information sources such as TV. Also it was pleased to visit a private company 
established in the aimag for repairing solar and wind energy sources, which had become 
daily necessity of   herdsmen.   
 
Large scale road construction works have improved roads between three big cities and 
some central aimags, thereby undoubtedly accelerates economic turnover of the region.       
 
7% of questionnaire respondents including ordinary citizens, businessmen and local 
administration people, responded that foreign aid invested in road construction, 
communication and power affected rural development very well, 66.4% of them 
responded 'well', and 23.7% of them answered 'poor' (Chart 6).  People working in this 
sector criticized that ODA project investments are not so efficient; especially equipments 
and technologies invested in communication, energy and health sectors do not operate in 
their full capacities, and explained reasons. However, machineries and mechanisms 
supplied by Japanese government aid and later transferred for the use of private road 
construction companies have been used very well and fully operated by their workers, 
which shows a clear example of highly efficient use of ODA in private sector.  
 
Significant portions of ODA resources were spent on road construction, but it was 
observed that the roads were damaged lacking necessary maintenance and service and 
people had to go by side-roads. So we need to pay attention on quality requirements of 
newly constructed roads and review current methods of selecting contractors. Seems that 
we need to direct more activities of Monitoring and evaluation department of the 
Ministry  of Infrastructure to  this end  and involve them actively from the beginning of 
project selection stage. Also we need to improve road maintenance and service 
management and increase budget resources, rather than start constructing a new road.  
  
To a question that whether repair and maintenance costs for infrastructure constructions 
reflected well enough in state budgets, 77.4% of respondents answered 'No', 20% of them 
answered 'Don't know' and only 2.6% of them responded 'Yes'. But, most of those 
answered 'Yes' evaluated that even they were reflected enough in fiscal accounts, they are 
not fully used for their purposes and in most cases they were spent on poor-quality 
services performed through personal relationships with contractors. Chart 8&9  
                                              Chart 8.                                      
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How do you assess the contribution of energy, road and 
communication in the development of the area? 
Well
66%
Do not  know
3%
Bad
24%
Extraordinarily well7%
 
 
 
 
Chart 9. 
 
Do maintenance budget sufficiently allocated?
Yes 
3%
No
77%
Do not know
20%
 
 
 
4.2.2 ODA effectiveness in rural education 
 
Large amount of ODA was also utilized by education sector. Over 10% of total ODA or 
about 250 million USD was spent for human resource development. In particularly, 
when we interview people about foreign aid invested in general education schools, 
teachers of some schools remember its benefit, while parents completely denied it and 
students responded that the situation was same as usual.  This puts forward a question 
how aid invested in this sector, particularly in the framework of general education 
training, were utilized effectively. A number of donors that focus much of their aid on 
this sector include Japan, ADB, Soros Foundation, and UN organizations. According to 
a report of MOECS, school attendance and number of dormitory students are drastically 
increased as a result of improvements in repair and maintenance of school and 
dormitory buildings.   
 
Also it was observed during the course of this research that donor assistance took 
various forms. For instance, Japan, through the Mongolian Government, assists in 
construction and maintenance of school buildings, while the Japanese Embassy's 
"Grassroots" project contributed significantly to repairing school buildings in a 
considerable number of aimags and soums, which was appreciated by local citizens. The 
Grassroots project could create a belief among rural people, particularly at the level of 
general education school management that local level initiatives can directly turn into 
actions.  Before it was difficult to imagine that their initiated projects would be 
implemented, but now people of this sector have become fully confident to visit Japan 
Embassy and make their initiatives work. However, we should note here that the school 
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directors who initiated and implemented the projects from the beginning told us, "Local 
administration people and MPs elected from the region are very good at reflecting such 
projects in their report as if they brought the investment themselves".  
 
On the other hand, implementation of ADB program "Education sector development - I 
&II" was not always felt in rural areas and out of those felt ones, one or two training 
rooms established by the program investment were said to be poorly utilized and valued 
too high. After I interviewed about it much with 10th class students, I also had to make a 
conclusion that students' use of such equipped rooms was not satisfactory. But not every 
place had such a poor utilization record. For example, we should mention that computer 
training room of Temuujin school complex of Khentii aimag had a very good utilization.  
 
Soum schools lack professional teachers. Soum school teachers are not only 
professionally incompetent, but also lack will and aspiration to teach children.  
 
Generally, maintenance of school and dormitory buildings has been relatively improved 
in recent years as it was obvious in aimags and soums we visited.  But still  there are 
cases that the people who manage and work there lack will and initiative.  For example, 
19 children were accommodated in a big room of school dormitory in Jargaltkhaan 
soum, Khentii aimag, but the room had only one 60 watt light-bulb which reduces 
children's ability to repeat their lessons. Here we do not need any ODA, rather we should 
and can do it ourselves. I hope now the situation of this dormitory got better, since it 
was planned to be repaired this summer by Sustainable livelihood project resources.     
 
Teachers and school officers were doubtful in their opinion on who are final beneficiaries 
of foreign aid.  
  
Similarly aimag internet network established by Soros Foundation operates properly in 
some aimags while it was closed in other aimags. For example, Dornod aimag 
administration has attached importance to internet and information and operated the 
internet network established by Soros Foundation properly.  By contrast, the 
Bayankhongor aimag administration closed its head computer, thereby making all 
network stations inoperable, because the administration believed the line rent were too 
costly. Even though all other network stations including schools paid their rents and 
expressed their ability to make payments, the aimag administration officials did not 
operate the network because of costs, which shows how they understand value of 
information in rural areas and attach radically different importances to it. Local 
administration staff do not always understand the necessity to attach importance to 
using information technology advantages in remotely located aimags in the current era 
of information.  
 
 
4.2.3 ODA effectiveness in rural health 
 
As concluded in the book "Location map and financing of health sector aid-2002", 
current project implementation directions basically meet 13 government objectives for 
developing health sector in 2000-2004, which shows there is a certain coordination and 
consensus between donors and the government.    
 
In total, over 100 million USD of ODA projects have been implemented in the health 
sector and 60% of them, or over 62.0 million USD, of ODA projects and programs are 
now under implementation. Also 27% of these projects are financed by loans. The 
volume of ODA funding invested in this sector comprises 17% of total health sector 
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expenditures; and 38.4% of total number of foreign aid projects and 48.5% of total 
project funding have been implemented and disbursed by aimag and district level health 
organizations.  In total, 23 projects and programs  funded by  16 donors have been 
implemented in  rural areas.  The table below shows what kind of projects and activities 
are implemented in aimags covered by the research.  
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Table  5. Number of health sector aid projects implemented in aimags covered by the 
research - by directions 
  
Number of projects 
Project objectives and directions   
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1. Reproductive health/ Children and juvenile 
health  
1 3  2 2 3 3 
2. Food and health  1 1  1 1 1  
3. Hygiene and food security    1     
4. Improvement in hospitall diognosis and 
treatment quality and supply of equipments and 
facilities 
2 1 2 3 3 2 2 
5. Collective participation 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
6. Disability and restorative treatment 1  1  1   
7. Other  1 1 1  1 1 1 
Source: "Location map and financing of health sector aid-2002" book  
 
As result of the ODA invested in the health sector, major indicators of the country's 
health status were drastically improved, including infant mortality rate which was 
reduced from 64 per 1000 live births in 1991 to 29 in 2002, according to the 
implementation report of millennium development objectives, which is really 
appreciable. However, we have lost chances to achieve higher outcomes. If we take only 
one example of infant mortality rate, it was possible to be reduced as far more as 
illustrated by following chart.  
  Chart 10.  
INFANT MORTALITY PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS
64.1 64.4 62.6
59.5 61.2
48
44.4
40 39.6
35.3 37.3 32.8
29.5 29.6
50.7
44.2
36.1
28.8
23.5
19.6
15.8 13.2 10.8 9.4 7.9 6.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
Real
If ODA
w as
used
efficiently
 
 Note: The chart illustrates estimation based on GDP of 1995 
 
The illustration shows that the health sector projects reached rural area in a fairly broad 
scale. But the my field research revealed that their utilizations were unsatisfactory 
indeed.                                                                         
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So that I continued my field research in aimag clinical hospitals, regional diagnosis and 
treatment centers and family practice group to investigate why ODA outcomes are not 
satisfactory.  
 
Family practice groups established by Health sector development program-I investments 
now work in a way like former division clinics, not using project equipments and 
facilities properly. For example, common practices were observed, including they kept 
their computer unused for the fear of breaking or placed it at doctor's home; they 
couldn't operate advertising facilities properly or used some common facilities for the 
purpose of bulletin board for officers; couldn't repair ambulance vehicle -motorcycles for 
7-8 months; and kept training room, special-purpose room and meeting rooms locked 
etc. Also very accurate and highly sophisticated diagnostic equipments were installed at 
aimag clinical hospitals, but they do not use them fully. For example, there is an 
expensive sophisticated microscopic apparatus "Fungus" designed for eyeball diagnosis 
at the Eastern region diagnostic center in Dornod aimag. But it was kept for several 
months unused and covered, since the trained specialized personnel who operates that 
device was on her maternity leave and later went for training in UB.  However, eye 
division of the center does not have an easy-to-use, simple, inexpensive and modern eye-
pressure measuring apparatus "Tornometer", which is necessary for examining eyes of 
each visiting patients. "That shows, there is no priority list for utilizing ODA and no 
consultation with professional people," said Mrs. Michelle Potter, who works at the 
center as a consulting nurse from England. The situation was also observed at Khentii 
and Zavkhan clinical hospitals.  For instance, though there is a biochemical testing 
equipment with capacity of making over 30 types of diagnosis, they couldn't operate it 
and still use their old methods of diagnosis due to lack of competent professional 
operator and necessary reactive chemicals.  In most cases, the trained personnel were 
sick, moved or went for training or the equipment lack necessary materials and 
chemicals that are too expensive. Moreover, ODA equipment tends to be used for 
different purposes, including private uses or for common regular activities, which 
actually need simple or elementary instruments. 
 
Besides, numerious training and workshops are being held throughout health sector for 
the last 3-4 years, which even make some rural hospitals with few doctors unable to serve 
their patients. Training and workshops are organized at the hospital, aimag centers and 
in Ulaanbaatar. Let's take only one example,  when we visited   3b,3c family practice 
groups located in the clinical hospital building of Selenge aimag center, there were no 
doctor to examine patients but only two nurses because three doctors were participating 
training and workshop: one in Ulaanbaatar, one at local administration office and 
another one at the clinical hospital. At the time, all doctors of aimag clinical hospital had 
gone to attend a workshop organized at the hospital at 11.00AM, so that patients came 
from rural soums and baghs were unable to receive a service. Local citizens I met 
evaluated that the service quality did not improve much though health sector receives 
large amount of ODA.  It was explained by seveal basic reasons, including: 
 
§ They do not realize their main duty is to serve the people; 
§ Poor management and organization, weak personnel structure and all the best 
doctors are in the management; thereby causes two consequences: first, to loose the 
best specialized doctors and second, to make management of the organization suffer 
due to unskilled managers; 
§ Inadequate number and training of specialists to operate modern sophisticated 
equipments and instability of trained personnel; 
§ Hospital working hours are too short, so that they do not serve everyone who wants 
to be diagnosed or treated; on the other hand, utilization rate is low for equipments;   
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§ Too many training and workshops are held, especially, it makes clinics with few 
doctors unable to serve patients; 
§ Some people tend to make training and workshops as a source of income and attend 
them as much as possible even if they were non-relevant; 
§ They do not select proper equipments to be received by ODA. Incoming equipments 
don't operate fully in their capacity, because someone supplies from the above or a 
politician brings to satisfy will of someone; 
§ There is no system to monitor health organization activities in relation to their 
received amount of ODA; 
§ Poor discipline of health organization officers, especially rural ones, due to too low 
standard of ethics; 
§ ODA equipments and facilities are used for different purposes.  
  
People’s respond to the questions, "Is there any corruption? If yes, mainly where is it?" 
revealed that most corrupt areas are first, police, court and prosecutor's offices, and 
second, the health sector. This result shows that the foundation of our  health care 
system is completely defective.  
 
Chart 11. 
                                                                                                                     
 
 
It is obvious that any large amount of ODA can not bring a desired outcome in that 
situation.  On the other hand, J. Surentsetseg concluded it in her article "Jobs and aid in 
Mongolia" that "As seen from the situation of 24 large projects implemented in the field 
of social security for the last 7 years, exactly where aid flows is very obscure", which also 
proves the fact.   
 
   
4.2.4 Other factors affecting poor ODA effectiveness in rural areas 
 
Another reason for ineffective utilization of ODA should be explained by poor 
management of public administration and public service organizations. By this research I 
felt that any large amount investments in hospitals, schools and public administration 
organizations can not bring desired outcomes when their management is poor.  
Does corruption exist? In which sector is it more 
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Customs, 9% 
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Highly specialized and skilled people mostly do technical works in foreign project and 
program implementation units because of their high level of salaries. For example, a 
specialized engineer works in a project unit as a driver or technical asistance officer. Such 
example is fairly common and brings two-sided consequenses. First, we're unable to take 
advantages of national specialists, and second, it tends to create a  whole sphere of 
society, specialized only by foreign aid projects and programs and isolated from livings 
of common people due to their high rate of salary. Such sphere of society is not only 
phenomenon in Mongolia, but also commonly observed in other countries that have too 
low level of avarege salary and receive large amouns of foreign aid.  This group of people 
are very sensitive to donors' project requirements and work toward fullfilling those 
requirements and participating proposed projects and programs, rather than feeling 
reality or landing on the ground of the country.    
 
In rural areas, main subjects that work on ODA implementation and play in a broad 
range decision making roles, including humanitarian aid and training, are soum and 
bagh governers. Whether aid products, goods, works, services and training  activities  go 
properly to their targeted beneficiaries depends fully on them.  That is,  how aid products 
find and reach the people or targeted group depend on sincerity level of bagh and 
khoroo governors. Half of the interview participants critisized that bagh governors did 
not distribute aid completely, though reported as if they distributed all and also they 
distributed to their close people and relatives. Rest of other interviewees answered, they 
did not know at all about the aid received and distributed. To take only one example: an 
agricultural company technician of Selenge aimag said that he heard personally that the 
bagh governor who gave 25 kg rice to an indigent household said them, "please say you 
received 50 kg".   
      
In other words, outcomes of small projects implemeted by soum, district, bagh, khoroos 
greatly depend on sincerity and principle of low and mid-level public administration 
officers and authorities. People I met told me, such public administration officers have a 
common dishonest and self-interested attitude.  Therefore, another independent study to 
determine spread of such situation would contribute greatly in refining monitoring and 
coordination mechanisms for further ODA utilization.  
     
Still exists common tendency that foreign consultants use much of foreign aid, and too 
expensive goods and equipments valued at high prices as well as almost outdated 
equipment and machineries are supplied in the forms of loan and aid. The general audit 
report conducted by the National Audit Office on 2003 activities of 13 UNDP-based 
projects mentioned that project fundings were made with many consecutive stages and 
25.3-62.7% total project budgets were spent on salaries of foreign consultants. Therefore, 
we should involve Mongolian side actively in the selection of consultants  and hire 
foreign consultants only in case if Mongolians do not have such expertise.  Also we  
should conduct selection of national consultants and officers, which tends to increase in 
recent years, in more realistic and fair ways and use expertise of competent national 
consultants extensively. Setting English proficiency as a main selection criterion is 
unreasonable, instead we should add weights to other selection requirements and involve 
specialized professional engineers and technicians accumulated relevant experiences and 
skills  as well as university professors and teachers.  
 
Utilization rate of project equipment and facilities has been reduced due to their 
inefficient utilization or "ownership" of one or several group of people.   
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Besides, the research shows that donors are not so cooperative with each other and they 
do reflect own institutional ambition to their activities.   
 
Environmental impact assessments, which have to be done by a company instructed by 
the Ministry of Environment, are not performed properly.  Actually those companies do 
not perform proper assessment and they issue an assessment report just changing the 
name, address and location of previous reports as  I informed by local project 
implementation units.  In other words, there are many companies that develop own 
businesses by foreign aid project contracts, but limit their work only by meeting 
formality requirements of project documents. As mentioned in the  above example, 
environmental impact assessments and environmental restoration assessments have to be 
done by a few companies. But they do not perform actual assessment, instead they just 
try to finance themselves from project resources by preparing assessment reports that 
meet formality requirements of donors.   
 
On-lending processes of ODA concessional loans are very slow and bureaucratic, which 
increases waiting costs of rural people and leads them to retreat from their initial 
enthusiaistic proposals and initiatives.  
 
Projects need to pay more attention on the use of locally available raw materials. Some 
projects, for instance "Complex basic social services" project supplies all goods and 
materials such as sand, wood and spike that are availably cheaply at local markets, from 
Ulaanbaatar, wasting more money on transporation. Thereby, they reduce efficiency of 
aid resources and spend transportaion costs several times higher than their purchasing 
costs of goods.  
 
Well-trained professionals do not work well at aimag levels. Aimag and local 
administration officers, including all positions from guardmen to governor politicize too 
much.  That is, they prefer ruling party membership over competence. NGOs and 
foreign aid projects are less likely to achieve their objectives  unless they have contacts 
and cooperation with local administration, thereby increases transaction costs. For 
example, aimag education department officers and NGO offcers travel through soums 
with same purposes, but  separately by different vehicles wasting double costs.   
 
Also the teachers, who attended 1-2 day training of ADB "Education development 
programme" implemented by the MOECS,  were promoted more than those 
methodologist-teachers, who completed 200-300 hours of programme training organized 
by Soros Foundation.  
 
In general, despite many training, workshops, study tours organized in the field of 
human resource development, significant amount of investment spent for this purpose 
and principal changes made in school and kindergarden syllabuses; it is too early to 
conclude that they brought substantial outcome in rural development.  
 
 
 
 35 
FOUR.   CONCLUSION 
  
As result of my research sought to answer the main research questions on how outcomes 
of concessional loans and aid contributed rural development and whether they were 
utilized effectively, I reached the following conclusion.  
 
Between 1991-2002,  donors contributed  over 1000.0 USD of grant aid and loans to 
each Mongolian citizen and this amount of ODA per capita made Mongolia one of five 
countries most dependent on foreign aid.  
 
Due to poor economic policies and relevant institutional structure and mechanism to 
implement these policies as well as poor law enforcement, our GDP per capita is 4-10 
times lower, investment rate is 9 times lower and infant mortality rate is 3 more times 
higher than their estimated achievable levels. In other words,  actual outcome of ODA is 
too low or at the level basically not felt in rural areas.  I would like to conclude that this 
low level of ODA effectiveness is caused by following factors. 
 
Ø State service is very cumbersome. There are too many administration offices in an 
aimag center, including aimag governor's office, soum governor's office, taxation 
service, health office, education and culture office, professional inspection office, 
court and police etc, which are oversized in comparison to the local population. 
Rather than encouraging enterprises from the start of its business, too many 
inspections and controls are imposed actively, which lead people to extinguish their 
initiatives to run a production. 
 
§ Public service human resource management is poor. Quality and performance of 
public service are not so good, which is related to incompetence and lack of working 
attitude of recruited personnel and poor time management of public organizations. 
Also due to too low level of salary in public sector, good professional officers prefer 
professional or non-professional  jobs at ODA project implementing units or 
promotion to higher managament positions when political environment is favorable. 
Then it leads to two consequences both to loose to loose a skilled specialist and to 
make management of the organization worse due to unskilled managers. Morover, in 
an aimag centers, competent personnel trained by series of ODA training for several 
years mostly work as project coordinator, secretary and translator while highly 
specialized young engineers work as project office driver and assistant officer.  
Thereby it distorts efficiency of human resource capacity and harms socioeconomic 
development of the country as well as creates so-called "project" group of people who 
have relatively high level of salary and isolated from the reality of life. Selection of 
foreign aid project officers only on the basis of their English proficiency and in 
accordance with donor's documentation requirement has become main cause of this 
improper practice. Also people, not relevant to the project objectives, or senior 
officers go abroad for project training and studies on reward-based procedures, so 
that they do not make any contribution to increase project effectiveness when they 
return.  
 
Ø Public administration officers of aimag local administration organizations politisize 
too much and discourage entiusiasm of professional people; they are very cautious in 
taking initiatives of a work; they like to own information and make their positions 
valuable; and disregard their duties to serve the people; therefore they create 
bureacracy at each level of administration, which also adversely affect on 
implementation and outcomes of foreign aid. 
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Ø Public administration and public service organizations have become accustomed to 
foreign aid, reacting in a way that it comes as usual and they - the public 
administration officers- have to use and spend it. In other words, they do not have a 
way of thinking, that the benefits of foreign aid should be delivered to the people 
through their services. Sufficient number of training was held for social sector workers 
in rural areas, but their outcomes are not so good due to poor human resource policy.  
A group of people, almost specialized by being a trainees, has been created.  
 
Ø Due to inadequate budget support and fiscal understatements, buildings and 
constructions built by project resources lack routine repairs and maintenance, 
therefore subject to early defects and damages; which is another reason for low 
efficiency rate of ODA project investments and low utilization rate of supplied 
equipments and technologies.  
 
Ø Rural community is in lack of information. Information accessibility is limited in 
rural areas, except for brief news on contract signing and tape-cutting ceremonies 
appear on TV or daily newspapers. Local people suppose foreign aid as a sack of 
flour or rice. Local people know very few or about 20 percent of all implemented and 
implementing projects, which proves information inaccessibility in rural areas.   
 
Ø It is not secret that corruption and conspiracy is popular at mid- and low levels of 
administration. Ministry, district, soum, khoroo officials take use of ODA projects 
and programs through their relatives and close partners. For example, by not 
delivering humanitarian aid completely to those necessary, helping in winning 
competitive tenders, receiving certain percent of bonus in return, co-benefiting from 
contracts, or asking for assistance on other matters from the winner of tender etc. 
 
Ø Because we do not think about how to continue a project further before 
implementing the project, project activities basically end with its completion. No 
organizational structure and pesonnel policy has been created to continue project  
operation, everything ends upon project completion just leaving  loan repayment 
amounts on the state budget and job history records on curriculum vitae of a few 
project officers.  
 
Ø ODA did not reach private sector, especially rural businessmen. Though one or two 
small amount of short-term loans with high interest rate was granted, the granting 
procedure itself is very cumbersome and its decision making is very time-consuming 
and bureaucratic, which increases waiting costs for rural people and tires them.   
 
Ø Projects directly managed by donors through their project implementation units 
reach their targets more. That is, projects implemented through public administration 
organizations achieve poor results since they do not always reach their targets fully. 
 
Ø ODA mostly focused on rural infrastructure and social sectors, but outcomes are 
unsatisfactory, especially in social sectors. 
 
Ø There must be priority list for selecting equipments and goods supplied by ODA. As 
result of receiving highly sophisticated, high-capacity, expensive equipment and 
apparatus that need specialized personnel currently not available in Mongolia, rather 
than simple, easy-to use instruments; large amount of assets are being held in storage 
due to their inefficient uses. Projects need to reflect the aspect of preparation and 
training for specialised operators before receiving such high-capacity equipments. 
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Ø Young graduates aspire to move into cities due to unfavorable living and working 
conditions caused by insufficient supply of heating, hot water and apartment houses  
in aimag centers.  
 
Ø Significant amount of ODA is costs for foreign consultants. 
 
Ø Products and services supplied by ODA cost too high. 
 
Ø Competitive tenders for selecting ODA project contractors and suppliers of ODA 
goods and products are not always conducted  in fair and appropriate ways. 
 
Ø Information on ODA implementation, utilization and outcomes are inadequate 
nationwide. Such information is exchanged only between few government officers and 
donors at official level. 
 
Ø Foreign aid and assistances utilized by public sector can not be effective in the 
current situation, where corruption took place widely with respect to the  too low level 
of salary of the people, especially of those work in public sector; where working 
attitude and approaches of public sector officers remain unchanged; where exists a 
system that enables to politicize every issue and disregard duties to serve the people, 
but try to increase values of their own position. Public sector is likely to attract large 
amount of investment in case if people's mindset, attitude and approaches are 
changed, if politicization is reduced, and if public sector salary level is increased at 
least 3-4   times from its current level to the level of project workers. Utilizing more 
foreign aid directly for the development of rural private sector would be more 
effective for the current situation.  
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FIVE. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVING ODA EFFECTIVENESS 
 
In order to achieve the main goal to find ways of improving foreign aid effectiveness in 
rural development, I explored how did we use ODA to date, what outcomes did we 
achieve, what were the main factors, as described in the above chapters. On the basis of 
my research findings I propose following recommendations.  
 
I. In the framework of policy regulation, we need:  
 
1. To draft and approve long and mid-term strategic plans to receive ODA and to reflect 
my comments and recommendations proposed by this research work. 
A. In setting directions for utilizing ODA in rural areas: 
Ø The first priority must be establishment of energy sources in aimag centers.  But here 
we should address issues of aimags. That is, first we need to unite aimags with very 
close centers and then disburse ODA in providing reliable sources of energy for these 
centers. At first order, we need to involve private sector producers of renewable 
energy sources into ODA projects and disburse necessary budget expenditures.  
Ø  To disburse ODÀ in urban development, especially in constructing housing 
complexes with hot and cold water and in expanding and renewing city sewerage 
networks.  
Ø To use long-term, low interest rate ODA loans for housing needs of aimag and local 
youths. To expand ADB housing loans into more cities and consider side effects that 
transaction costs of such loans may increase due to  ineffective complex structure 
created if the loan documentation procedures are too cumbersome and request terms 
and conditions rural  citizens can never achieve; 
Ø To provide concessional loan sources for rural private businesses that process natural 
and livestock-origin raw materials and run agricultural production; and to develop 
small and medium enterprises in aimag centers at first order; 
Ø To disburse ODA in establishing performance-based chain system that linked 
herdsmen, veterinary service and products aimed at developing veterinary sector and 
improving livestock health and breeding; which would be an export promotion 
measure;    
Ø To involve wider range of private organizations operating in rural social sectors, such 
as private clinics, schools and training centers, in ODA projects and activities;  
Ø To implement advertising campaign and public awareness training measures aimed at 
improving ethics and mindset of public administration, public service and special 
service officers and reducing their inefficiency, bureacracy and corrupt practices; and 
to involve local NGOs in this campaign; 
 
Ø To conduct systematic training on public sector human resource policy; to close all 
options that link job duties of public administration and public sector officers with 
their political views and eliminate the practice that employ own relatives. For this 
purpose, we need to establish open information system officially in all aimags and 
secure equal access for all aimag and local citizens. 
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B. In taking stance to reduce portion of loans in total ODA down to 35-30% and to increase 
portion of grant aid up to 65-70%, to make it close to the standards of other developing 
countries: 
 
Ø To stop receiving economically inefficient, but socially effective loans in the near 
future; 
 
Ø To use only grant aid but not loans in rural social sectors; 
 
Ø To suspend temporarily the ODA disbursement on further construction of roads 
unless repair and maintenance budgets of previously constructed roads are  reflected 
adequately in fiscal calculations; 
Ø To establish a "head" institute for policy analyses and evaluation and utilize ODA 
only for efficient projects approved by the institute; 
 
Ø To organize broad public discussion on large ODA projects involving professional 
organizations, research institutes and users and to enable opportunity for the people 
to express their opinion, before making decision to receive assistance; 
 
C. To separate functions of economic development policy from MOFE and establishing 
'head' institute of development policy  
 
Ø The institute shall have a non-political structure comprised of competent leading 
economists and shall be responsible for conducting economic analyses on further 
ODA directions and loan projects and consulting the Cabinet; 
 
D. To restructure the FACC maintaining balance of representation from NGOs, research 
institutes, businesses and citizens, so that they can: 
Ø have discussion and consultation on new project proposals; 
Ø discuss performance of previously implemented projects; 
Ø issue press reports on results of discussions; 
 
2. To draft and approve urgently the procedures and rules on implementing the Law on 
foreign aid regulations, including: 
 
- Procedure on registering foreign aid granted in the form of goods and 
products 
- Procedure on domestic on-lending of foreign aid resources and its contract 
form 
- Procedure on project implementation report 
- Medium-term program on receiving foreign aid 
- Procedure and guideline on requesting necessary documents and materials 
from relevant bodies 
- Procedure on reporting storage, protection, usage and expenditure of 
foreign aid resources 
- Procedure on creation and use of foreign aid records and information 
database 
 
Ø To concentrate the donor-to-donor coordination into hands of Mongolian 
government and identify their documentation requirements and reporting systems 
with each other; 
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II. In the framework of implementation coordination, we need: 
 
1. To ensure conditions to involve loan users actively in the project drafting stages, 
including: 
 
Ø Economic efficiency calculation; 
 
Ø Economic analyses; 
 
Ø Implementation forms; 
 
Ø Repayment schedule; thereby makes project assumptions close to reality and makes 
efficiency calculations reasonable. 
 
2. To establish criteria for measuring ODA project implementation and performance 
outcomes and to make them bases for decision making to receive assistance. 
 
3. In making on-lending contracts with ODA loan users, government shall take equal 
responsibility with the users in terms of government duties with regard to the loan. 
 
4. To eliminate donors' and political influence on ODA project implementation and 
decision-making: 
 
4.1 To ensure equal representation of government bodies, NGOs and private 
sector organizations in the composition of ODA project management committees; 
 
4.2 To restrict political influence on all kinds of competitive tenders; 
4.2.1  To ensure fair and transparent conduct of competitive tendering for  
for the supply of ODA project goods and services, excluding ministers, 
deputy directors, department heads and officers of ministries and 
administration departments from the composition of tendering committees 
and instead, involving professional people from aid beneficiaries or 
receiving organizations as well as  broad representation from of local 
citizens (here I did not refer to representatives of citizens' assembly).  
 
4.3 To stop the practice that politicians use equipments, constuctions, goods and 
services supplied by projects for the purpose of advertising campaign to 
strengthen their political position; 
 
5. To make implementation reports identical for all donors and Government of 
Mongolia; 
 
6. As for the supply, Mongolian side needs to develop common criteria and requirements 
for foreign aid goods and products at the very beginning and to follow them at all level. 
Especially, there must be high level of quality and consumption requirements. For 
example, they: 
 
6.1 shall be under production in the near future; 
6.2 shall be easy-to-use; 
6.3 shall be priced not higher than market rate;  
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6.4 spare parts and supporting materials shall be easily available; 
6.5 shall have low utilization costs; 
 
In other words, the above procedures shall reflect terms that selection of machineries and 
equipment must regard their technical capacity to match desired operational capacity, 
operation complexity and procurement of spare parts or materials. 
 
 
7. To make personnel training and stability guaranteed: 
 
7.1 To prepare at least three specialized operators for highly sophisticated 
equipments and to set up a promotion system in correlation between working 
hours and utilization rate of supplied equipments;  
 
7.2 To set salaries of trained operators minimally at the level of project officers; 
 
7.3 To involve staff with stable employment in training and study tours of ODA 
technical assistance; 
 
8. To set cost ceiling on foreign consultants on the basis of special survey. 
9. To establish information system that covers all stages of foreign aid proposal, 
discussion, utilization and evaluation;  
9.1. To create an integrated ODA information database that automatically 
registers all projects; 
9.1.1 To provide certain discount and incentive for projects and measures 
registered to the information database; 
9.1.2 To do regular adjustment with donors' information, which will be of 
benefit to both sides; 
9.2 To provide systematic information on project implementation and follow-up 
utilization: 
9.2.1 To publish a series of information bulletin "Foreign assistance in 
Mongolia"; 
9.2.2 To report on media expected outcomes of a project before its start 
and actual performance outcomes after completion of the project; 
9.2.3 To create information system, where receives public opinion and 
information on project implementation and utilization and provides such 
information to others; 
9.2.4 To provide information on project continuance, utilization and 
effectiveness by intervals of one, three and five years after the end of 
project. 
III. In the framework of outcome, continuance and monitoring: 
1.  To report amount of assistance directly goes to beneficiaries on public media, which 
can become a self-controlling mechanism; 
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2. To establish performance criteria during project drafting phase and include them in 
the list of criteria for project approval;  
Ø To define socio-economic criteria for loan projects and make them transparent for 
all organizations and individuals involved in initiating loan projects; No project 
fallen behind the criteria shall go upper level organizations. 
Ø To consider continuity of a project before its start of implementation; and for 
some projects necessary to run continuously with stable structure and staff left, 
such conditions of continuity need to be included in the list of project approval 
requirements;  
3. To make all criteria transparent to public; 
4. Monitoring and evaluation divisions of ministries need to monitor performance and 
outcomes of ODA project implementation and utilization; 
5. To allow  NGOs and private sector organizations to evaluate follow-up project 
utilization and publicize their reports on public media.    
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SIX. APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
LOCAL SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
(BY PRODUCTION, SERVICE AND BUSINESS TYPES) 
 
Organizations  
U
H 
B
H 
K
E SE 
D
T 
K
O ZA 
Tota
l  
Aimag administration officers  4 2 2 8 3 3   6 28 
Soum administration officers  9   1 13   2     25 
Bagh administration officers          1      1 
Aimag public organization officers (excluding 
health and education organizations)  2 5 4 7 4 4   3 29 
Health sector officers      5 10 6 5   6 32 
Education sector officers 2 19 7 3 15 4   2 52 
Private businessmen  4 10 5 9 6 5   8 47 
Banking sector officers  3 1   1 1 2    8 
Foreign aid project officers  5 4 4 20 3 3   6 45 
Herdsmen 5   7   1      13 
Agricultural sector workers      1 2   5    8 
Mining and power station workers   2 1   1    4 
Retailers 6 18 12 14 12 21    3 86 
Road and construction workers      2        2 
Patients       11 1 5                 17 
NGO officers 1 1 1 1 3 3   10 
Total 41 62 52 99 57 62 34 407 
Appendix 2 
Business entities registered to aimag tax offices 
           
    1992 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Uvurhangai Total     493 404 329 303 316 330   
LLC     129 128 130 130 138 166   
Cooperative     98 39 37 40 45 79   
 Private 
business 
entity     194 167 86 62 56 0   
Dornod Total     210 244 277 277 340 430 447 
LLC 12 50     100     132   
Bayanhongor Cooperative 45 125     74     144   
Total           256 308 395   
LLC           127 166 220   
Khentii Cooperative           36 41 63   
Total         797 915 1076 1259   
LLC       399 445 505 589 673   
Selenge Cooperative       43 47 38 59 81   
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Appendix 3.  
 
 
Sectoral allocation of ODA disbursed between 1991-2002  
 
Sector Total Loan Grant aid 
Agriculture 154.4 38.99 115.4 
Construction 29.97 - 29.97 
Energy 253.41 130.52 122.90 
Environment  43.54 - 43.54 
Financial sector 85.67 72.41 13.26 
Government reform  40.89 24.43 16.46 
Health 91.31 14.07 77.24 
Human resource development 234.67 14.32 220.35 
Industry 195.71 142.14 53.57 
Macroeconomic restructuring 188.19 90.28 97.91 
Minerals 10.88 - 10.88 
Other 166.51 148.92 17.59 
Social welfare 48.55 17.85 30.70 
Special aid 368.21 162.44 205.77 
Communication 116.00 66.99 49.01 
Trade 3.22 - 3.22 
Transportation 404.89 311.54 93.35 
Public utility 41.95 20.14 21.81 
Total 2476.99 1255.04 1222.9 
Source : Ministry of Finance and Economy, Mongolia ‘Effectiveness and Contributions of ODA for Mongolia’. 
Mongolia Consultative Group Meeting 19-21 November, 2003. Tokyo. Japan. 
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Appendix 4 
 
List of foreign aid projects implementing in Selenge aimag (over 40) and other implemented measures 
    
Donor Project implementors Name of project Project term, objectives and activities 
Grassroots   
Contributed to the resolution of financial matters for the maintenance of schools and kindergartens of Sukhbaatar, Hutul 
and Shaamar soums. Repaired building roof of Secondary school No. 1, Sukhbaatar soum (68 million MNT) and 
provided houses for 5 households of 5 baghs of the soum. Granted x-ray apparatus of 76 thousand USD, electricity 
generator for 500 households and computer facilities of 2.5 million MNT to Hutul soum. 
  КР-2 Grain renewal measure covered 35 entities of 8 soums. Equipment renewal of 200 million MNT was done in Hutul. 
Ecology fund Aid 
Covered 30 children, 26 households in Altanbulag soum. Reforested 8 hа of area in 2003, 8 ha of area in 2004, and 
organized training for students. Forestation continues in Altanbulag soum of Selenge aimag.  
North East Asian 
Forest Forum and 
Japan  
Rehabilitation of Tuj 
pine forest Granted aid necessary for foresting over 400 ha of area 
Improvement of 
population 
immunization 
coverage  
Aimed to improve population immunization and supply reliable vaccines in Khushaat. Project term is 10 years. Supplied 
one motorcycle of 1799,8 thousand MNT, one electricity generator of 462,0 thousand MNT, a Vaccine refrigerator of 
250,0 thousand MNT. Trained one doctor, vaccinator and 3 assistant doctors in Bayangol soum. Granted a motorcycle 
of 1702,8 thousand MNT. Reduced children's illness by 1.8% and incidence of infectious diseases with vaccines by 
60%.  
  Implements many projects for reducing children's illness and incidence of infectious diseases with vaccines. 
Ja
pa
n 
JICA   Made research since 1994 on what sectors need what kind of aid. 
Renovation of 
training methods Project covered Hutul town. 
U
SA
 
  
  Farmer to farmer Covered 8 business entities of 3 soums in agricultural sector (Hutul) 
U
N
, 
M
O
FA
 
UN – MOFA 
Sustainable 
grassland 
management 
Project duration 2003-2007. Covers 102 people, 52 households and 5 groups of herdsmen in Bayangol soum. 
Organizes training. Employed full-time local project officer and provided a set of computer, printer, desk and chair, JPS 
for pastureland measurement. The project covered over 200 people in Bayangol soum and established 4 cooperatives 
and 1 group. 
Orkhon project   
Children and family 
project 
Implementation started in 1999 and went to 2nd stage in 2004; the project cooperates with Bagahangai and Nalaikh 
districts of Ulaanbaatar city. The project aims mainly at improving social security and protecting rights of children living 
in difficulties by taking a complex, step-by-step measures to support families of selected districts that live below living 
standard. It covered Khuder soum. 
  
Starts free-of-charge professional courses for home appliance repairman, construction pipeline repairman, electrical 
welder, salesmen, treasurer and barmen. Many people have been registered. 
N
or
w
ay
 
Norway international 
charity organization 
  Conducted activities to reduce unemployment in Altanbulag soum and covered 1000,9 people. 
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Health development 
program 
Project duration 1998-2008. Aims to train health sector officer and doctors in Selenge aimag, implement Complex 
management of Children's Management program for children and reduce infant mortality. By now, it has trained 62 
college-degree doctors, financed IDM program for children, involved 60 children in summer nursing camp, established 
training and information center and spent in total 350,000 USD with annual disbursement of 50,000 USD to certain 
objects, including Egneshgui household clinics, physical treatment room in Orkhon tuul, micro-laboratory in Hutul, 
training and information center in Nomgon and Mandal, physical treatment facilities in Baruunkharaa, steam heating in 
Orkhon etc. Granted 362.8 thousand MNT to Khushaat soum for training 3 persons for 9 months in three years. In 
2003, there was no mortality of children aged 0-5 in Bayangol soum and 7 doctors were trained in 2 training. Covered 
also Khuder soum. 
The project has been implemented since 1995. It focuses on protecting Mongolian thin-wool sheep-breed in livestock 
sector. Here it cooperates with Livestock Scientific Research Institute. One of the main project successes was a pilot 
farm established in Khongor soum. They aim to secure constant growths in number of Mongolian thin-wool sheep with 
the help of this farm and local herdsmen.  Its wool processing center uses thin sheep wools in its processing. Poverty 
Reduction Fund organized training on wool and gave a wool-processing machine to Sukhbaatar soum (801 USD and 2 
engines). The project also covered Hutul town. School teaches how to make wool products in Bayangol soum. 3 groups 
of vegetable growers have been created. The project also covered Khuder soum. 
  
Selenge 
development project 
 The project allocates loans over 2 million MNT every year to Orkhon, Saikhan, Shaamar, Sukhbaatar and Javhlant 
soums to improve living standard of household vegetable growers and support irrigated cultivation and organizes 
regular training 1-2 times a year involving over 300 vegetable growers. (Orkhontuul soum) Distributed 150 kg of 
vegetable and flower seeds to 350 people and 135 kg of seeds to 270 people in Sukhbaatar soum. Granted loans of 
500 thousand MNT every year in Bayangol soum and distributed necessary amount of new sort seeds. Organized each 
year 1-2 training and involved over 100 vegetable growers. According to requests of some people, built small sized of 
heating boiler in Altanbulag and Dulaankhaan and solar energy hot water showers in 6 soums. Holds 2-day project 
planning local workshop to define needs. The project also covered Hutul town and Khuder soum. 
Environmental 
protection, 
sustainable 
management of 
natural resources 
It has 5 objectives. 1. Forestation with sustainable management 2. Joint possession forestry 3. Sustainable 
management of tourism 3. Sustainable management of hunting 4. Natural adaptation and balance 5. Management of 
Khan Khentii special protected area 
Local human 
resource capacity 
building project Held a workshop for three days 
Forest road 
The project will construct minor roads linked soum centers to central roads. Drafted a project based on forest census 
research. According to request for concessional loans, the project is going to be implemented in Selenge and Zavkhan 
aimags. Now the project is at the MOFE. Forest census will be conducted in Tsagaannuur and Eruu soums. 
  
Granted financial aid and sent professional expert to organize the fighting against infectious insects and diseases and 
hunting management in Selenge aimag.  
FRG  GTCS 
Mother-friendly 
clinics  Implementation continues in 3 soums 
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Reproductive health 
sector support project 
Project duration 1998-2006. The project aims to improve family planning, pregnancy protection and disease prevention 
among pregnant women and birth age population and to reduce maternal mortality. During these periods, the project 
invested 200 million MNT, implemented projects in 11 soums involving 40 thousand people and achieved no maternal 
mortality record in 2003. Established mothers' rest rooms, solar energy hot showers, fully equipped training rooms and 
small steam boilers in soums, and reproductive health complex in aimag clinical hospital; and organized multiple 
training for professionals. Established hospitals in Tsagaannuur and Altanbulag soums. The project operates also in 
Bayangol soum. Performed interior design and furnishing of mothers' rest rooms in 8 soums and 3 villages. Invested in 
total 107 million MNT into health sector of Hutul town, including mothers' rest rooms, fully equipped training exercise 
room for elders, echo-diagnosis apparatus, fully equipped dental clinic room (9.2 million in 2004), vehicles for bagh 
doctors etc. Project implementation is doing well in Bayangol soum and all women got good awareness of reproductive 
health. Also, informal education project of World Vision organized distance education and established training centers 
in the soum and made 18 adults and 56 children literate. 
  
Household 
agriculture Involved 57 citizens of 3 soums. 
France 
Sante-Su 
humanitarian 
organization 
Santis project: Soum 
clinical aid quality 
improvement project 
Project duration 2003-2006. Project aims to develop soum hospitals and involved all total number of 135 soum doctors 
to a 160-hour training on health first aid and service since 2003. This year it will equip every soum with a computer and 
spend a budget of 60 million MNT. Trainers will visit every soum 7 times and take measures to implement hospital 
projects and organize supplementary training. Established hospitals in Tsagaannuur and Khushaat soums. Granted aid 
to 4500 people and 10 households in Altanbulag soum. 8 doctors attended training in Bayangol soum, their service 
quality has been increased. Granted solar energy hot water shower to Bayangol soum. Implements project in Khuder 
soum. 
Netherlands Khadag society   
Aims to create jobs, reduce poverty, develop agricultural business and supply medical equipments. Granted dental 
equipment. 
UK 
Save the Children 
UK   
Established "Unur bul" center to create favorable living environment for 25 dispossessed children and help them study 
and live normally. The center now normally operates receiving financial support from local budget in recent four years.  
Switzerland 
JCS development 
cooperation agency 
Reduction of natural 
disasters 
Implementation lasted one year in 2003. Granted food aid to households suffered by dzud, including 2500 kg rice of 
950000 MNT, 7000 kg flour of 2100000 MNT to 100 households, home medical package of 15.0-1500000 MNT to 100 
households, and 10 tones potato of 3500000 MNT to 120 households for cultivation, which produced 53.6 tones of 
potato for food needs. Also distributed 3600000 MNT of meats to 100 households and involved in total 280 households. 
Granted aid of 10037.0 thousand MNT to 90 households and 270 citizens in Orkhon soum between April 20, 2003 and 
October 07, 2003 and improved household livelihoods. Granted 10 ger houses for homeless people in Sukhbaatar 
soum. 
    Completely resolved kindergarten house problems in Javhlant, Sukhbaatar and Mandal soums. 
UNDP   
Pastureland 
management 
improvement project 
Implementation started in Byangol and Mandal soums since 2003. Created 15 groups of herdsmen in those soums and 
trained local coordinators creating their working environment in order to improve lives of herdsmen by correlating 
livestock pastureland management with climate changes. 
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Soros 
Foundation     
Made intellectual and material investment for education reform and disbursed 35.5 million MNT covering total 7 schools 
of 6 soums and organized training involving 19 national trainers and over 400 teachers. 5 children with highest 
achievements entered universities with supports from Soros Foundation. The Foundation helped actively in improving 
computer procurement of soum schools, increasing effectiveness of distance education, expanding pre-school 
education, establishing mobile library to serve school children, providing service vehicles etc., by the above amount of 
investments. Granted a copy machine of 250,0 thousand MNT, books of 32,0 thousand MNT to Khushaat soum and 12 
training computers to school No. 4 of Sukhbaatar soum.  
    
Granted 1750.0 of aid to 100 households and 296 citizens to help single-headed or indigent families below living 
standard in Orkhon soum between 2004.1.10-2004.2.1 and granted 5 tones of rice to 100 indigent households 5 baghs 
in Sukhbaatar soum.  
  Food security 
Granted food aid to households suffered with snowfall and dzud for a month since June 20, 2004, including 5 tones of 
rice to 100 households and 694 people. 
  Informal education 
Gave basic education to 12 children out of 25 children involved as result of activities to educate and socialize children 
dropped out of school in Bayangol soum. Involved 50 children of Mandal soum (implements 14 project). Stopped 
practice of children that wander in trains, established soum development fund and will continue its operation for 15 
years.  
World  Vision     
In cooperation with aimag Governor's Office organized measures to distribute total 90 tones of food aid to over 1900 
herder families of 16 soums of the aimag, which suffered in the winter 2003-2004. 
WHO Global Fund   
The project will implement in Bayangol soum between 2003-2005 for the purpose to let prostitutes use condoms 100%. 
In this framework, trained one specialist in a 2-day training. 
  
Health sector 
development 
program I, II Supplied medical instruments to Hutul town of Saikhan soum.  
  
Education sector 
development 
program I, II 
Granted a training room to School No. 1 of Sukhbaatar soum and classrooms of chemistry, physics and biology and 
information equipments to the school of Hutul town.  
ADB   
Rural development 
project 
Loan projects for agricultural production have been implemented through aimag commercial banks involving rural 
residents of herdsmen and agricultural workers. The project involved total 300 business entities and citizens in 2003. 
Luxemburg   МОN-002 
Starts linking aimag clinical hospital echo-diagnostic equipments to Hospital No. 3 in Ulaanbaatar city through 
telecommunication. Trained 2 aimag doctors in a course for three months. 
UNESCO   Let's live learning 
Organized activities to teach professional skills to the population and make them literate and involved over 200 
households. The training involved 40 people in Hutul city.  
World bank   ТА 
Implemented in Altanbulag soum for 3 months. Repaired school and kindergarten buildings, heating system and 
pipelines for 6500,0, involved 27 people. Built new fresh water system of Bagh No. 1 and school steam boiler of Bagh 
No. 5 in Sukhbaatar soum (fresh water-6500, 0, steam boiler-1600, 0). 
АDRA     Distributed Kinova food rice to 223 workers of 4 organizations in Sukhbaatar soum from poverty reduction fund.  
Inner Mongolia   Investment Established dry-cleaning service in Sukhbaatar soum with investment of 10 million MNT and created 2 jobs. 
Fu-Hua LLC   Investment Established wood carving enterprise in Sukhbaatar soum with investment of 50 million MNT and created 20 jobs. 
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  Grant aid Donated 3 million MNT for the central garden in Sukhbaatar soum. 
PR China   Investment Established wood stick factory in Sukhbaatar soum with investment of 100 million USD and created 120 jobs. 
APEC   
Increasing public 
awareness and 
releasing children 
from heavy labor 
Project duration 2003.9.26-2005.2.26, Involves 64 children of 32 households in Bayangol soum. Organized training two 
times. Brought whole project team to Ulaanbaatar and trained them for three days. 
UN Children's 
Fund   
Collective health 
project 
Project aims to improve supply of medicines and medical products and create regular source of assets for drug stores. 
Project continued between 1996 and May 2003 and supplied total 3.7 million MNT of medicines and medical materials. 
Now drug stores finance themselves from own resources. 
Agriculture Establishes irrigation system in Bayangol soum. 
European 
Union TACIS 
Agriculture, livestock 
breeding 
Nomun Khan LLC was involved in an agricultural project. It receives 25% of fertilizers free of charge and purchases 
other 75%. 
Korea   Food program Distributed cash on the site during 2003 fire. 
Peace corpus     6 American came to Hutul and organized training. 
      Implemented a project to increase public awareness of mercury poisoning. 
DANIDA       
    
This is the list of projects mentioned at the consultative meeting of coordinators of foreign aid projects implemented in Selenge aimag. Ìºíãºí óñ 
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                                                                                                                                                                                        Appendix 5. 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Bayanhongor aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 83.2 85.2 87.3 89.6 91.1 85.3 85.7 84.4 
Number of herder households Number 12212 12470 13938 14090 14186 14246 13698 11643 
Number of poor population Person 26826 26816 33738 31342         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2227 3370 3112 2395 2036 2000 1833 2465 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 59 42 52 31 45 38 33 44 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2227.1 2233.1 2428 2511.3 2475.1 1522.8 1581.7 862.2 
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 78.8 89.7 85 183.2 194.5 167.8 141.9 272 
Local budget income Million MNT 506.6 538.3 638.8 809.6 689.5 788.4 1767.7 2047.1 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1779.7 2181.5 2474 3493.5 3411 4558.9 5247.9 5187.4 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Khentii aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 73.8 73.9 73.7 72.9 70.9 71.4 71.9 72 
Number of herder households Number 7552 7269 7095 7794 7798 7722 8016 7378 
Number of poor population Person 10193 12216 22308 17466         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 1735 1953 2005 1686 1538 1864 1496 996 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 36 40 43 33 25 45 33 41 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 1100.9 1150.5 1254 1388.7 1462.3 1471.4 1356.7 1378.5 
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 7537.7 12250.1 13645.9 14815.9 13334.7 9708.5 7939.2 14227.9 
Local budget income Million MNT 618.9 780 889.2 870.1 936.9 1044.4 1494.8 2215.1 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1792.1 2272.6 2718.8 2994.9 3485.8 4624.5 5336.4 5312.2 
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Main socioeconomic indicators of Khovd aimag 
          
  Measurement unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 86.3 87 87.7 87.4 86.8 87.8 88.7 88.5 
Number of herder households Number 9572 9528 10202 10313 10368 10670 10470 9137 
Number of poor population Person 18342 23122 25579 39705         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 1863 2065 1977 1921 1890 1880 1389 1029 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 43 47 33 39 38 36 35 35 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2070.6 1954.9 1926.5 1795.9 1867.9 1836.3 1512.7 1323.9 
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 1641.7 2342.7 2344.6 2940 2978.5 2690.8 2648.2 2958.2 
Local budget income Million MNT 392 455.8 601.6 775.1 810.1 819.1 1272.4 2245.3 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 10789.9 2119.5 2523 3022.3 3388.8 4343.4 5245.7 5532.6 
 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Selenge aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 96.4 97.3 98.1 99.2 100 100.9 101.7 102.2 
Number of herder households Number 2254 2471 2312 2719 2189 2803 2762 3244 
Number of poor population Person 11385 12678 8865 16682         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2134 2714 3267 1732 1320 1508 1129 822 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 37 36 25 25 35 18 19 30 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 504.7 506.6 522.5 569.4 622.6 654.5 645.4 683.4 
Cultivated  agricultural area Ha 130103.6 123966.7 120790.5 140145 130391.6 93656.4 100648.6 125092.1 
Local budget income Million MNT 2503.1 3308.2 4753.5 5344.8 5020.2 4194.9 4623.7 3966.3 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 2899.6 3822.5 4983.8 5827.1 5853.4 6947.1 7041 8107.3 
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Main socioeconomic indicators of Uvurhangai aimag 
          
  
Measurement 
unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 109.5 110.5 111.5 112 111.4 113 114 113.9 
Number of herder households Number 17197 17687 19845 18723 19787 19653 18721 17814 
Number of poor population Person 27324 34970 44347 36457         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2588 3264 2286 2906 2435 2469 2420 2137 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 35 50 35 37 32 29 20 32 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2595 2550.1 2718.2 2921.5 2956.6 2159 1869.1 1665.4 
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 13661 10842.1 9935.3 3629.2 1769.7 2935.4 2772.8 3512.2 
Local budget income Million MNT 892.2 1375.5 1735.2 1465.9 1450.8 1279.2 1893.2 3119.7 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1855 2554 3559.5 3639.5 4415.9 4721.1 5481.5 6161.1 
 
 
Main socioeconomic indicators of Dornod aimag 
          
  Measurement unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 77.8 78 77.5 76.7 75.3 74.2 74.5 74.7 
Number of herder households Number 3783 3728 4483 4175 4514 4908 4959 4683 
Number of poor population Person 19286 21927 25980 18978         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 5253 5982 6220 4216 2177 2397 2272 1321 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 68 51 60 39 42 43 41 41 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 591.4 594.2 657.2 735.7 811.8 826.2 794.1 825.4 
Cultivated  agricultural area Ha 8737 11587.6 14605.4 8162.3 6811.5 5144.2 5338.8 6181.5 
Local budget income Million MNT 804.9 795.3 1157.1 1023.8 908.9 983.5 1579.6 2152.8 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 1579.5 1862.7 2765.2 2996.6 3314.6 4111.7 4633.8 4869.8 
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Main socioeconomic indicators of Zavkhan aimag 
          
  Measurement unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Permanent population, by the year end Thousand people 95.9 95.8 95 93.7 90 87.2 86.8 84.6 
Number of herder households Number 12164 12304 13468 13284 13305 12825 11081 10121 
Number of poor population Person 16916 22318 26210 42673         
Unemployment, at the end of period Person 2120 32625 4159 3843 3200 2829 2916 1830 
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Number 45 39 37 33 39 30 30 39 
Number of livestock Thousand heads 2401.4 2474.5 2556.5 2603.6 2432 1941.3 1486.7 1443.2 
Cultivated agricultural area Ha 985.3 1170.7 710.3 1094.8 724.3 705.7 366.5 613.8 
Local budget income Million MNT 506.8 565.4 614.7 723 794.1 771 1347.2 2077.6 
Local budget expenditure Million MNT 2002.6 2433.3 3143.6 3160.3 3840 4720.2 5559.4 5849.7 
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